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ABSTRACT 
 
In spite of the skeptical forecasts in the early 1990s when Brazil’s transition to 
democracy process was starting, this presidential regime is now considered stable. Therefore, 
the analyses in political sciences today seek rather to explain how this process has evolved 
than to recommend profound changes in the system’s direction. This work is based on one of 
such theories, called the “Executive toolbox”. Its proponents contend that the president has 
tools that enable him or her to bring stability to the system through a balanced use of a set of 
tools in the Executive-Legislative relations. One of such tools is the budgetary prerogatives of 
the president - which, in the Brazilian case, include the liquidation of individual amendments 
of MPs. This thesis will study pork barrel politics in Brazil in comparative perspective and in 
relation to other tools in the president’s kit, especially with coalition goods. An existing 
debate in Brazilian literature about pork is taken as starting point and qualitative research 
methods are used including media analysis and personal interviews with Brazilian MPs . 
 
 
Keywords: Executive toolbox, Executive-Legislative relations, Democracy in Brazil, 
pork, coalition goods 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Brazil is considered a stable and consolidated democracy. It is now subject of numerous 
studies in political science that aim at explaining its transition to democracy, which started 
less than three decades ago. When the military left power in 1985, the country’s institutional 
design  has remained presidential, while its party system went from the 1980s a two-party 
system during dictatorship to more than 30 officially registered parties nowadays, 24 of them 
represented in Parliament.  
These characteristics have allowed for much criticism from political scientists: 
presidentialism would be perilous for Latin American countries accustomed to caudillos 
(Linz, 1990), and would be even more difficult to remain democratic if combined with 
multipartidarism (Mainwaring, 1993). Nevertheless, democracy is so far the only game in 
town in Brazil (according to Linz and Stepan’s definition, 1996). Given so much previous 
criticism, what is, then, the reason for the system’s stability? 
From the combination of what has been produced by comparative politics about Brazil, 
specifically, and new presidential systems that originated during the Third Wave (Huntington, 
1991) in general, a new theory has emerged, one on which this work is based. This theory, 
called the coalitional approach, contends that the stability of the system is the result of a 
“toolbox” presidents have at their disposal to bring equilibrium to the Executive-Legislative 
relations (Raile, Pereira and Power, 2011). One of these tools is the president’s budgetary 
prerogatives. In Brazil, a specific prerogative the president has is the unilateral decision to 
appropriate the resources exactly as approved in the Budget Bill passed by parliament and 
signed into law by him or her afterwards or not doing so. In other words, the budget, as 
approved by Congress, is not necessarily the same one that will be liquidated by the president: 
he or she1 is not obliged to follow it strictly. And, indeed, to a large extent presidents do not 
follow it fully historically. 
Besides the fact that such a budgetary prerogative allows the president to make 
expenditures that were not approved by Parliament - or, conversely, allows her to not spend in 
areas she was granted authorization by Parliament to spend in -, such budgetary prerogative 
                                                 
1
 Current Brazilian president is a woman, Dilma Rousseff (PT), elected in October 2010 and who took office  in 
the 1st of January 2011 for a four-year term. For this reason, from here on the feminine will be used when 
referring to the current Brazilian president. 
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has an additional component, one that affects even more directly the relations between the 
Executive and the Legislature in the country: congressmen in Brazil, both senators and 
deputies, are entitled by law to amend, individually, the Budget Bill in order to send pork to 
their constituencies, predominantly in the form of financial resources destined to fund public 
works at the local level2. However, if the president decides not to appropriate these resources, 
she is not obliged to. This gives the president, in theory, an important bargaining power: if 
representatives in parliament want their constituencies to receive the resources they approved 
for them in the budget, the president could well bargain their appropriation in exchange for 
something she needs from the Legislature, e.g. the approval of a specific bill. 
This possibility has been studied by Brazilian political scientists, especially in the last 
ten years. Articles were written on the subject, analyzing the importance of this presidential 
prerogative in the Executive-Legislative relations and seeking to define how important it is as 
a bargaining tool.  
In the first half of the 2000s two distinguishable positions were devised. One sustains 
that pork in Brazil is a very important tool the Executive uses to implement its agenda, 
disciplining the coalition by privileging it with a higher level of pork appropriation. This 
school of thought also claims that individual amendments (which is what pork is called in 
Brazil) are traded at the individual level; i.e. vote with the government, Mr. Representative, 
and you will get pork, even if not officially in the coalition (Pereira and Mueller, 2002). An 
opposite view claims that pork appropriation is far from being an essential tool in the 
Executive-Legislative relations, although these authors agree with Pereira and Mueller that 
that members of coalition parties receive more pork than those representatives in the 
opposition. They contend, however, that the relation at the individual level is impossible to 
establish (Fernando and Limongi, 2005). 
Both sides in this debate have relied on quantitative research methods to reach their 
conclusions. Since the discussion has come to an impasse between these two positions, this 
work will attempt using other theoretical perspective and research methods to make a 
contribution. Therefore, the coalitional approach/Executive toolbox theory will be our 
theoretical starting point. Qualitative methods will be in order to conduce our research. The 
objective is to analyze to what extent pork appropriation is responsible for democratic 
stability in Brazil while, based on the “Executive toolbox” theory, establishing what is its 
relative importance compared to the other tools and how they complement each other. This 
                                                 
2
 A clear definition and conceptualization of pork will be provided in the next Chapter. 
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will be made in two distinct and complementary ways: analysis of news on the media about 
individual amendments during a (recent) fifty-day period; and interviews with five 
congressmen about the theme. 
This thesis will be structured in the following way. First, an explanation of pork is in 
order. Because pork will be in this work’s menu from this introduction to its conclusion, it is 
important to define the term clearly and conceptualize it beforehand. A literature review will 
follow in Chapter 2. It will be divided in three parts: pork in comparative perspective; the 
debate on Executive-Legislative relations in presidential systems; and, returning to pork, how 
it is seen today by literature in the Brazilian Executive-Legislative relations context. In the 
theory and research design chapter, Chapter 3, the Executive toolbox theory will be 
elaborated and the hypotheses and expectations will become clearer. In Chapter 4, the 
Brazilian budgetary process will be briefly explained. In Chapter 5, four sections will be 
created to analyze individual amendments as distributive policies; technical issues related to 
individual amendments; pork in the Executive-Legislative relations; and a debate about the 
structure of the Brazilian budget. Every section will have three sub-sections: news collection, 
interviewees opinions and preliminary conclusions. In the conclusion, I will analyze the four 
preliminary conclusions in light of the theory framework and hypotheses exposed in this work 
and make recommendations for future research.
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1. CHAPTER ONE – DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALIZING PORK 
 
According to Merriam-Webster, pork can be either “the fresh or salted flesh of swine 
when dressed for food” or “government funds, jobs, or favors distributed by politicians to 
gain political advantage”3. Dictionary.com, the most popular on-line English dictionary, 
visited monthly by more than 50 million users, also gives two different meanings for the 
entry: “the flesh of hogs used as food” and, with an Informal, in italics, set before its second 
assertion, “appropriations, appointments, etc., made by government by political reasons rather 
than for public benefit as for public buildings or river improvements”4. It comes therefore at 
little surprise when one talks about pork in politics to someone not used to political science 
terminologies and gets strange looks back. I have found myself in this awkward situation 
quite a few times trying to explain to a stranger what my Masters’ thesis is about - and, 
sometimes, the listener would add an inquiry to the strange looks: “Pork? In politics?” 
It is the second meaning of the word, evidently, that is in the interest of the studies of 
political scientists. However, how did the word pork become so popular in political science, 
as to become so frequently used in articles and books, together with the equally rather odd 
expression pork barrel? This last expression, it is important to note, in dictionaries has a 
somewhat different explanation, but at no rate distant from meanings number two found in 
dictionaries for pork: “government projects or appropriations yielding rich patronage 
benefits”5 and “a government appropriation, bill, or policy that supplies funds for local 
improvements designed to ingratiate legislators with their constituents”6.  
The origins of the expression are not certain, but the link between meaning one and 
meaning two in the entry pork of the aforementioned dictionaries can be found in the 
following tentative explanations: before the 20th century, pork barrel referred “to a container 
for unwanted extras from slaughtered pigs” and, some hundred years ago, to a “second, 
humorously related, meaning: a political candidate would climb on an inverted pork barrel on 
the street corner by the local general store to address the crowd. He would shout and wave his 
hands and make extravagant promises about all the benefits he would send back in those 
                                                 
3
 Retrieved from: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pork. Accessed on: 21.07.2012. 
4
 Retrieved from: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pork?s=t. Accessed on: 21.07.2012. 
5
 Retrieved from: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pork%20barrel. Accessed on: 21.07.2012. 
6
 Retrieved from: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pork+barrel?qsrc=2446. Accessed on: 21.07.2012. 
 13 
days”7. In the Oxford World and English dictionary online, it is contended that the origin of 
the expression comes “from the use of a barrel to keep a reserve supply of meat”, dating from 
the early 20th century8.  
All of these explanations found in lexicons9, i.e., outside literature specific to political 
science, in spite of the negative connotations they imply (e.g. “political advantage”, “political 
reasons rather than for public benefit”, “patronage benefits”), have the word “benefit” or 
“improvement”. To avoid this negative or even pejorative term, new concepts emerged in the 
literature, as for instance “distributive politics”. Evans discusses the use of the term in 
political science, and states that normally literature will define “pork barrel policy as that 
subset of distributive policy that is inefficient, where the costs of the policy exceed the 
benefits”; however, she does not make any distinction between both words and actually uses 
both interchangeably in her work since “the point is to explicate the political uses of 
distributive politics in policy making, not its economic implications. The efficiency or 
inefficiency of a policy, while economically important, is rarely central to decisions in 
Congress about whether to request or provide benefits” (Evans, 2004: 3-5).  
The reason for this little or no attention to policy efficiency in economic terms is 
derived, according to the aforementioned author, from the fact that “their incentive [of the 
members of Congress] to do so [ignore the distinction between the efficiency and inefficiency 
of a policy] stems in part from the fact that project costs in the form of money spent in a 
member’s district can be reinterpreted politically as benefits to the district. As those costs are 
shared nationally by all taxpayers (citing Shepsle and Weingast, 1981), a legislator normally 
has little reason to care about the economic efficiency of his or her own project or of any bill 
that contains it (citing Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981). Furthermore, the readiness with 
which federal agencies claim that a project’s benefits equal or exceed its costs highlights the 
practical difficulties of making judgments about project efficiency in any case (citing Maas 
1951)” (Evans, 2004: 4). To be clear, this work sides with this interpretation: the efficiency of 
pork allocation is not to be judged here and, even if it were, it does not seem easy or even 
possible to distinguish pork if it is considered a subtype of distributive policy. 
                                                 
7Retrieved from: http://readersupportednews.org/pm-section/26-26/5404-pork-barrel-spending-earmarks-and-
logrolling. Accessed: 21.07.2012 
8
 Retrieved from: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/pork+barrel. Accessed: 21.07.2012 
9
 Dictionaries were consulted to define pork mainly because the definitions in the scientific literature was or too 
technical or, even, inexistent. 
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Another aspect that is important in this debate is the frequent uncertainty as to how one 
should conceptualize pork: is it clientelism? Is it patronage? Or is it something else?  
Kopecky, Scherlis and Spirova (2008), in an article in which they conceptualize and measure 
party patronage, give a good example of this confusion when they point to clear a 
contradiction found in literature. In a same important political science handbook10, for 
example, two different conceptualizations of pork barrel are found: the first one as patronage, 
by Wolfgang Müller; and that of Jonathan Hopkins, considering pork barrel a form of 
clientelism (Ibid.: 3). The article concludes that pork barrel is different from clientelism, and 
consider both, pork and clientelism, together with corruption, as forms of state exploitation 
that are only possible because of patronage - but they do not call pork barrel a form of 
patronage either. In their words: “patronage is the necessary condition for the emergence of 
the three of the other [clientelism, pork barrel and corruption], since it is only due to their 
ability to control state positions that parties are able to manipulate state resources in the three 
referred ways” (Kopecky, Scherlis and Spirova, 2008: 7). 
In this conceptualization, which I agree with and take for this thesis, pork barrel is 
neither a form of clientelism, nor of patronage. It depends on state funds and on legislation to 
take place, whereas clientelism depends on subsidies, jobs, loans, medicines, food and the 
like; and patronage’s state resources are no more than jobs in the public and in the semi-
public sector. The party goals both in clientelism and in pork barrel politics are to build 
electoral support, while patronage would target the control of policy making and state 
institutions and political support. The recipients of every form of state exploitation differ in 
clientelism (present or potential party voters) and pork barrel (people belonging to a specific 
constituency), while recipients of patronage can be anybody. Finally, both patronage and 
clientelism can be either legal or illegal, while pork barrel can only be destined to a 
constituency if there is a law creating it. It should therefore be, and in fact it is, always legal.  
Publications that include the study of pork in comparative politics are rather scarce. Take 
the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, for instance. Its subject index reveals that in 
the volume’s 968 pages of articles written by renowned scholars in the field of comparative 
politics, the expression pork barrel politics appears only once. It is present in Susan Stokes’ 
article on political clientelism, only to be differentiated from clientelism: “[i]t is the 
distributive criterion of electoral support that distinguishes clientelism from other materially 
                                                 
10
 The volume in which Müller’s and Hopkin’s definitions appear and which is referred by the authors is “The 
Handbook of Party Politics”, edited by Richard Katz and William Crotty (2006). London:, Sage. 
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oriented political strategies. Consider, by contrast, what is known in the USA as pork barrel 
politics, in which benefits are paid to one or a few districts while costs are shared across all 
districts (citing Aldrich 1995, 30)” (Stokes, 2007: 605). 
Pork, in the political sense, is a word that lacks an exact translation either into 
Portuguese, language in which a great deal - if not most - of this research was made. This 
makes even more important a clear definition and conceptualization. In Brazil, pork is known 
by the Portuguese expression emendas parlamentares individuais, which are, literally, 
parliamentarian individual amendments to the national budget made by Congressmen with the 
intention to benefit constituencies in their states of origin. Something very close in meaning to 
earmarks, expression that is more common in the American literature11. When researching for 
this work and closely comparing the Portuguese and English versions of the main articles 
used here as reference, it becomes clear that pork or pork barrel are not translated equally 
throughout the texts neither are they left in the original. For pork, the word fisiologismo, 
which could also be translated into English as patronage or even cronyism, is used by two 
authors (Pereira and Mueller, 2002: 266) whilst políticas distributivas, i.e., literally and 
correctly translated to English as distributive policies, is used by the other two authors 
(Figueiredo and Limongi, 2005: 759). These are but two examples of how difficult it is to 
translate the term to Portuguese. 
As a conclusion to this opening section, in this work the economic efficiency or 
inefficiency of pork barrel politics is not taken into account. The expressions pork, pork 
barrel, pork barrel politics and individual amendments will be used interchangeably, while 
alternate expressions such as distributive politicies or earmarks will appear seldom - if at all. 
Recapitulating, pork is conceptualized based on Kopecky, Scherlis and Spirova (2008): it is a 
legal form of state exploitation based on the availability of funds and legislation to take place; 
Congressmen aim at electoral support when sending pork to their constituencies and the 
beneficiaries of pork are people belonging to a given constituency12.  
                                                 
11
 This concept of “individual amendments” is indeed very similar in meaning to the term “earmark” used in 
American Political Science literature. The term earmarks appears in both dictionaries so far cited: as “a provision 
in Congressional legislation that allocates a specified amount of money for a specific project, money or 
organization” in Merriam-Webster’s; and, in Dictionary.com, as “a provision in a piece of Congressional 
legislation that directs specified federal funds to specific, projects, programs, organizations, or individuals”, 
followed by an example of current usage: “Lawmakers requested almost 40,000 earmarks worth more than $100 
billion directed to their home district and states”. In this last source, a “comparison” with pork barrel is 
recommended, just after the word meaning.  
12
 The proposal of the authors with their work, it is important to take note, is to conceptualize and define party 
patronage. Therefore, the definition and conceptualization of pork is also made at the party level, i.e., instead of 
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“congressmen” who aim at electoral support through pork, in the authors’ work one would find the word party. I 
extended here this definition and conceptualization to the individual level, too. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1.   PORK IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
The electoral connection (Mayhew, 1974 in Lancaster and Patterson, 1990: 458) is how 
the American variant of pork has been described in specialized literature. In Lancaster’s 
definition, whose work on pork in comparative perspective is the most cited on Google 
Scholar when it comes to this specific topic13, pork is a collective good destined to a 
representative's geographic constituency in order to enhance his chances of being reelected 
(Lancaster, 1986: 68).  
For the purpose of this study, it is important to stress that in the United States the 
decision on how much pork will be introduced in the budget and where it is going to be sent is 
for the legislators to make, at first instance, and the Congress as a whole, at second. 
Therefore, the process is entirely restricted to the Legislative arena, leaving little space for the 
Executive to have a say on it. Studies have discussed this thoroughly, showing that legislators 
in the US Congress depend on each other’s votes to get their target appropriations approved in 
Congress, the arena where this game is played (Bickers and Stein, 1981). Lancaster (1986), 
shows comparatively how pork can be influenced by electoral structures, illustrating his point 
by demonstrating that electoral systems with single-member districts such as those in the 
U.S., India or New Zealand have more opportunity for robust pork activity. Electoral systems 
with single-member districts, according to the author, allow “accountability linkage between 
the incumbent and his constituency [to be] the strongest; the sole representative faces the 
electorate without others being held responsible for what has transpired between elections. 
The single representative can readily claim responsibility for any allocated project to the 
district” (Lancaster, 1986: 70). 
As opposed to that, all of the multi-member proportional representation (PR) systems he 
studied, with no exceptions, were classified as weaker in opportunities for pork activity. All 
the remaining countries in that category (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland14), i.e., the category of countries that are weaker in 
                                                 
13
 133 citations were found in the internet academic searching tool of Goolgle for the article, according. It 
appears as result number one when searching for the words “pork” and “comparative” on the website. Retrieved 
from: http://scholar.google.nl/scholar?hl=nl&q=Comparative+Pork&btnG=&lr=. Accessed: 11.08.2012  
14
 Differently than Lancaster, there are authors who classify Switzertland as a hybrid  system since the cabinet is 
elected for a fixed term of four years and cannot be dissolved by a vote of confidence (Lijphart, 2003: 147). 
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opportunities for pork activity, are parliamentary regimes, with the exceptions of Colombia 
and Venezuela. Lancaster's explanation is that a confusing accountability link between the 
representative and the elected is created with such PR systems, leading to a disincentive to the 
payment of pork, since identifying who are the authors of the amendments made is frequently 
a difficult or even impossible task. 
Brazil - at the time Lancaster published his study, 1986, a country that was just starting 
its transition to democracy - today has a multiparty-PR presidential system even more 
fragmented if compared to Colombia or Venezuela in the 1980s. Nevertheless, as it will soon 
be evidenced, there is robust incentive for pork activity in Brazil, which is contrary to 
Lancaster's cross-country comparison findings. In other words, Brazil should be in 
Lancaster’s category of weaker in opportunities for pork incentives because it has a PR 
system of elections for representatives. 
At least three explanations for this phenomenon can be proposed here: first of all, even 
though Brazil does not have a majoritarian system, the fact that its electoral districts are every 
state in the federation and the vote is given nominally to a representative instead as for the 
party makes Brazil a special case of presidential-PR system, which finds only a close parallel 
in Finland’s elections for its Lower House system (Nicolau, 2006), also of PR with open list 
(Limongi, 2006: 22). For this reason, even though the electoral system is of PR, many 
congressmen’s votes tend to be concentrated in a geographical region, as the voter is allowed 
to pick an individual candidate. Sending pork back to municipalities in this area where an MP 
received most of his votes, as he is entitled to do that, would be only natural. 
Secondly, it is true that, in Brazil, pork does not have such a strong “electoral 
connection” as elsewhere (in the U.S., for instance). This does not mean that it is not 
important. As Samuels (1998; 2002) clearly showed, “there is no statistical relationship 
between a deputy's pork-barreling success and his or her subsequent electoral success” 
(Samuels, 2002: 315). However, “[individual amendments] [e]xist to make resources 
available to MPs so that they can offer ‘concrete things’ to their constituencies” (Grohmann 
and Chiavegati, 2006: 3). These last authors also state that the use of individual amendments 
in Brazil is a direct consequence of their very availability, not because of its electoral 
importance per se: “if there is a possibility of using these resources, why not? And if you are a 
representative lacking better personal attributes, but know how to make your presence grow 
in your constituencies, how will you do that if not through the use of the available resources 
such as the individual amendments?”. This to say that “moreover, it doesn’t matter that 
 19 
allocating resources in their constituencies doesn’t impact dramatically in the votes they get” 
(Grohmann and Chiavegati, 2006: 5).  
The somewhat reduced importance of pork for congressmen’s reelection is also 
attributed to the fact that political careers in Brazil are not static, i.e., reelection rates are high 
in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies after every election also but many congressmen tend to 
continue their political careers at the local level in mayoral posts or at the State level as 
governors, which is actually what they mainly aim for: Executive posts where they have 
control over a budget and can propose and execute public works (see Mainwaring, 2001). In 
this case, pork-barreling may, according to Samuels (2002), help: it might not be important 
for the reelection for an office in the Legislature, but sending resources to a municipality or a 
state the deputy or senator wants to be mayor or governor of later on, may be a good example 
of “concrete things” he has done for the place he wants to be governing. 
Thirdly and lastly, parties in Brazil do not have, in general, a strong ideology and the 
“electoral system has helped to generate fractious parties, which has favored pork payoffs to 
individual legislators over policy compromises among unified parties” (Morgenstern, 2002: 
443). These three explanations (nominal vote in elections for representatives, importance of 
pork for politicians’ careers beyond parliament and fractious/non-ideological parties) allows  
the suggestion that they are at the origin of the strong incentive for pork barreling in Brazil. 
Add to these explanations the fact that the Executive has an important role, being the one who 
gives the final say on the executions of the deputies amendments, having the possibility of 
using them as a bargaining tool, and the picture is complete: Lancaster’s theory can be 
updated with yet another example of a country with strong incentives for pork barreling. What 
is more: one that would not fit his previous classification simply because the author did not 
account for such a combination of presidential-PR system with large plurinominal electoral 
districts and a fragmented and not strongly ideologic party system. 
In the international context, Brazil is indeed considered a special case regarding the 
payment of pork in the book Legislative Politics in Latin America (Morgenstern and Nacif, 
2002), where the quote used in the previous paragraph was taken from. It is in the chapters of 
the book about Brazil that pork appears the most (Amorim Neto, 2002; Ames, 2002; Samuels, 
2002). When the term appears in the remaining chapters, about Argentina, Mexico or Chile, it 
is either to mark its almost irrelevance there or to refer to the Brazilian case, which will be 
reviewed below.  
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Brazil has a “‘workable’ legislature, frequently assenting to presidential bills but 
generally requiring compromises or payoffs in exchange for the assent”, with a coalitional 
president that bargains with Congress through the use of pork and a Congress that reconciles 
to that practice (based on Morgenstern, 2002: 442; and table of Cox and Morgenstern, 2002: 
455). The incentives for pork barrel activities in the country, in comparative perspective, are 
thus very pronounced. 
 
2.2.   PORK IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS OF BRAZIL 
 
Before discussing pork barreling in Brazil, a briefly explanation of the budgetary process 
of Brazil is in order15. It actually starts before the president introduces the Annual Budget Bill  
(Lei Orçamentária Anual - LOA) itself. To be clear, a full budgetary cycle in Brazil starts 
every four years, with the elaboration by the Executive and approval by Congress of  
Pluriannual Plan (Plano Plurianual - PPA). This is a budget bill that gives the guidelines for a 
four year period, being the first of the years comprised in the cycle equal to the second in a 
new presidential mandate. The PPA has to be submitted by the President to Congress by the 
31st of August of his first year in office. This means that in a president’s first of four years in 
office he or she will have to respect the guidelines of the PPA that his or her predecessor 
approved in parliament four years before. The reason for this overlapping is to ensure some 
administrative continuity between different administrations, which might well be led by 
opposing parties. 
Besides the PPA bill, which is evidently presented only once during a four year 
president’s term, there is another Bill that has to be approved by Brazilian Parliament before 
the Budgetary Law itself. The Budgetary Guidelines Bill (Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias -  
LDO), is sent to parliament every year by the 15th of April and has to be approved by 
parliament before the 17th of July. If the Parliament fails to do so, two consequences are 
provided by the Brazilian Constitution: Parliament cannot enter into recess and the LOA 
cannot be sent by government to parliament. The Brazilian budgetary process, in short, as 
established by the Constitution, is composed by three complementary bills: a Pluriannual Plan 
(PPA), with four-year guidelines; a Budgetary Guidelines Bill (LDO), which has to be 
                                                 
15
 In the Annex, the reader will find a short history of the budgetary process in the Executive-Legislative 
relations in the world and in Brazil. 
 21 
annually approved by parliament and respect the PPA; and an Annual Budgetary Bill (LOA). 
It is in this last one that individual amendments are made by Congressmen.  
To organize the whole process in parliament, there is a Joint Committee for Planning, 
Public Budgets and Monitoring (Comissão Mista de Planos, Orçamentos Públicos e 
Fiscalização - CMO). It has a one year mandate and is composed by 30 federal deputies and 
10 senators, and the same number of members substitutes. In order to become a member of 
the CMO, the MP may not have been member of the committee in the previous year. 
The CMO is therefore the first instance responsible for analyzing, amending and 
approving the PPA, the LDO and the LOA. When the LDO is approved by Congress, after 
having been amended and approved by the committee (as usual, not diverting from the PPA 
guidelines), it goes to the president for signing into law (or veto); once signed into law, all 
Ministries are requested to send their budget estimates for the next fiscal year to the Secretary 
of Federal Budget, of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, who will gather all 
proposals and send it in the form of a single Annual Budget Proposal (LOA) to the president. 
The president, then, has to send the LOA to Congress by the 31st of August. When in 
parliament, the proposal is subject to the analysis of the CMO again, and its body of 80 
congressmen, including all deputies and senators and their respective member substitutes. 
At this stage, when the LOA is sent to parliament and is officially under the committee’s 
scrutiny, is when the MPs are invited to offer their individual amendments to the bill. It was 
with Resolution 2/1995-CN that these individual amendments made by congressmen were 
better organized. The formula created was entitling every deputy and senator the same 
amount of pork to be approved and distributed to their constituencies in an ordinated way,  
not “arbitrarily” anymore (Figueiredo e Limongi, 2008: 49) as it was in the past.  
In other words, every deputy and senator can amend the federal budget up to a certain 
amount; besides, every faction representing a state in parliament (there are 26 states in Brazil 
and one federal district, everyone with its own faction) and every permanent committee in 
parliament also has the right to amend the budget and propose the funds limited to a certain 
amount for their specific purposes under the investments expenditures. These account 
generally for something between 1% and 2% of the whole budget.. As for the individual 
amendments, of interest here, in 1995 their value amounted to R$ 1,5 million16 (about US$ 
0.75 million) worth of public funds every deputy or senator could send to their constituencies, 
                                                 
16
 This value would amount today to R$ 6.882.457,52, corrected by the IGPM index. The value in individual 
amendments representatives can make to the budget has thus more than doubled. Retrieved from:  Accessed: 
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public institutes or other organizations that are legally accepted as receivers of such 
payments. For the 2012 budget, these value was of R$ 15 million (about US$ 7,5 million), 
after having been increased regularly through the years. 
After the approval of the LOA in Parliament, the president can either sign it into law or 
veto it. Once signed into law, nevertheless, it is not necessarily respected by the president: the 
budget approved by parliament is a law that “authorizes” government expenditures, but does 
not oblige the Executive to follow it strictly, is the current understanding17. When the annual 
budget is already a law that is into force, this does not mean that it will be fully respected by 
the Executive in Brazil. The budget in Brazil is authorizative as opposed to mandatory: 
Parliament approves the budget “authorizing” the President to follow its guidelines and 
disposals, but the President does not need to obey all its dispositions18. This includes 
individual amendments made by congressmen: it is to the discretion of the president to decide 
whether these will be liquidated in the next fiscal year or not. 
 
2.3.   PORK BARREL POLITICS IN BRAZIL 
 
As seen in a previous section, even though the “electoral connection” might not be as 
relevant in the Brazilian case as it is in others, it does exist and it is important. Since 
individual amendments are invaluable for deputies and senators, and the budgetary process is 
a relevant part of the Executive-Legislative relations in the country’s political system,it is 
self-evident that political scientists should be interested in how this specific feature of the 
                                                 
17
 The several laws applicable to this interpretation will not be listed here. For a concise article on the differences 
between an authorizative budget and a mandatory one, I recommend reading the article Orçamento Autorizativo 
x Orçamento Impositivo by Roberto Bocaccio Piscitelli, Technician in the Budgetary Consultancy of the 
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Retrieved from: 
http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/1636/orcamento_autorizativo_piscitelli.pdf?sequence=1.
%20Acesso%20em:%2021%20abr.%202012. Accessed: 25.06.2012 
18 A debate about this subject is existent in literature, but it is not quite established yet. In parliament however, as 
one of the main newspapers in Brazil reported on March 16th 2012,  Senator Romero Jucá, of the centrist Partido 
do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party - PMDB/RR) and a member in 
the government's coalition, was planning to push for a constitutional amendment turning the table and making 
the budget impositive. According to the newspaper,  Jucá, who was until the beginning of that  same week the 
leader of the Government in the Senate, position he had hold for 12 years, was proposing that reform as 
retaliation for his recent dismissal from the government leadership by president Dilma Roussef (PT) and as a 
form of pleasing his colleagues, unsatisfied with the government announcement that it had decided to cut R$ 18 
billion that were originally meant for the payment of individual amendments ("Rebelados da base criam 
obstáculos para o governo" (Rebels in the coalition are creating obstacles for the government) Jornal O Estado 
de S. Paulo, P. A4, March 16th 2012). A specific sub-chapter will deal with the “mandatory budget debate” 
further in this thesis. 
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budgetary process impacts these relations. Even more so when it is for the Executive to 
decide whether the individual amendments made by MPs will indeed be liquidated.  
Several studies were initiated, especially after the way individual amendments were 
presented in Parliament in an organized way from 1995, which allowed for easier and more 
accurate data collection as well. Two articles, in particular, discussed this matter in Brazilian 
literature by means of comparing support in parliament and pork liquidation. 
The first study, published by Carlos Pereira and Bernardo Mueller in Portuguese in 2002 
and in English in 2003, declared that the appropriations of congressmen’s amendments to the 
annual budget are “one of the most important mechanisms that the Executive uses to negotiate 
with its coalition in Congress”, calling them a “low cost political ‘currency’” (Pereira and 
Mueller, 2003: 3), because the category of the budget the congressmen can amend, i.e., the 
investment category, entails only between 1% and 3% of the whole budget. Their main 
argument is that, since the approval of the individual amendments is not the end of the line, 
the fact that the president still has to liquidate the resources “gives the Executive a very 
important instrument to reward and punish the congressmen according to the level of support 
or opposition they give to the Executive throughout the year” (Pereira and Mueller, 2003: 16). 
Even clearer: “the Executive deliberately permits that MPs amend the budget in order to use 
their appropriation as a tool to coordinate and discipline its coalition in Congress”, and “the 
Executive’s strategy is to wait until the last moment to appropriate budget investments, 
including (...) individual (...) amendments, as a way of pressuring legislators to behave 
according to its preferences during the year (Pereira and Mueller, 2002: 272)19.  
The authors contend that, in at least two different occasions, this strategy worked. When 
they cross-referrenced the liquidation of individual amendments by the Executive and votes in 
Congress between January 2000 and May 2001, they showed in graphs that the volume of 
liquidation peaked in two very sensitive moments for the Executive at the time: the first one, 
in May 2000 occurred just prior the voting of the national minimum loan in the Chamber of 
Deputies. The president did not want the loan to be as high as the Chamber was proposing 
                                                 
19
 A translation was made from the Portuguese since, in the English version of the article, the text lacks the 
strength found in the original (Pereira and Mueller, 2003: 19). In its English version the authors state only that 
“the Executive does strategically use the appropriation of budget amendments”, in the sectionsentence “In order 
to present evidence that the Executive does strategically use the appropriation of budget amendments, a first test 
is done by comparing roll call data for each member of the Chamber of Deputies with the number of individual 
amendments that were in fact appropriated as a proportion of those proposed by the congressman and approved 
by the Congress” (p. 16), which does not include a translation for the section “coordenar e disciplinar a sua 
coalizão no Congresso” found in the same section in the Portuguese version, i.e., “coordinate and discipline its 
coalition in Congress” is found in the original in Portuguese andand is now recovered here.  
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and, therefore, compensated the presumed political costs the MPs would have in voting for a 
lower proposal with the payment of pork, liquidating their amendments. The second peak they 
identified was not related with a particular vote in parliament but to the prevention of deputies 
from signing a petition to create a Parliamentary Investigation Committee (Comissão 
Parlamentar de Inquérito - CPI) in Congress that was intended to ultimately investigate 
corruption in the Executive. Many deputies who had already signed the document withdrew 
their signatures from it, the authors contend, after receiving the confirmation that their 
individual amendments would be paid. Both occurrences were during the second term of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) (Pereira and 
Mueller, 2002: 287-289). 
These two cases support the authors’ claim that the Executive “buys” political support 
from congressmen in parliament, also at the individual level, through the appropriation of 
their amendments. The correlation at the party level is clearly also found, i.e., members of 
parties that are in the governing coalition tend to receive proportionally more pork than 
congressmen in the opposition: “Brazilian Executive adopts two strategies in the process of 
allocating its budget: the first one is to reward congressmen that pertain to parties in the 
coalition and punish those who do not; the second is to consider the size and the relative 
significance of the political parties that are part in the presidential coalition” (Pereira and 
Mueller, 2002: 292)20. Their evidence is found by summing up the average of public 
resources received by members of parties in the coalition vis-à-vis members of parties in the 
opposition: “The legislators that belonged to the five political parties that make up the 
presidential coalition in Congress (PFL, PSDB, PMDB, PPB, and PTB) received on average 
83.19% of the total public resources that were appropriated as individual amendments, 
whereas they held only 73.68% of the seats in the House. In other words, the governing 
coalition appropriated resources more than proportionately to their size in the Chamber of 
Deputies, while the opposition was under-rewarded” (Pereira and Mueller, 2003: 22).  
In an answer to this study, Fernando Limongi and Argelina Figueiredo published a 
response in an article in 2005. They challenged from the introduction of their article the very 
idea of a “political currency” at the individual level, i.e., that the Executive bargained with 
MPs negotiating their votes at the individual level. They claimed that, in spite of being a 
mainstream idea, one that is commonly heard in the press or, even, within the academic 
                                                 
20
 The Portuguese version of the article has been used here because the statement above is not to be found in the 
English version; note: the texts do not encompass very important differences between them. 
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community, “it is not possible to establish this claimed causal relationship” (Limongi and 
Figueiredo, 2007: 3). Notwithstanding, they validate the correlation at the party level 
hypothesis. Comparing the execution rates of individual amendments and putting 
congressmen together in their respective parties, the authors confirm that there is a strong 
correlation and state that “the execution of individual amendments is dictated by partisanship 
criteria” (Ibid: 8). When the data is disaggregated, however, the same relationship cannot be 
found. One of the main claims of the authors is that there are many legislators from parties in 
the coalition that receive less pork individually than others in the opposition: “[a]mendments 
are executed without votes being given to the Executive” (Ibid: 12). There are even cases of 
MPs in the coalition that have voted 100% of the times with the government but did not 
liquidate any of their individual amendments, whilst, in the opposition, there are cases of 
representatives whom have voted against the Executive at a rate of 100% and had all of their 
amendments liquidated (based on table “Roll-call votes 1996-2001”, in Limongi and 
Figueiredo, 2007: 13). How could that be possible, if individual amendments were to be a 
“political currency”according to Pereira and Mueller?  
Therefore, a number of questions are posed by these last authors to challenge the 
“political currency” hypothesis and to minimize the importance of pork barrel politics in the 
Brazilian Executive-Legislative relations. They ask, for instance, “if individual amendments 
are so decisive for their political careers, why do they not rebel against the low rates of 
execution?” (Ibid: 5).And, how is it possible that some members of parties in the opposition 
have more of their amendments liquidated than others in the coalition? These remarks 
allowed for the fierce debate existent today in Brazilian literature regarding the pork in the 
Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE - THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.   THEORY 
 
If there used to be skepticism in the past about the processes of democratization in Latin 
America, especially due to the adoption of presidential-PR systems in most of the countries of 
the region, an important share of the academy is more likely now to change the foci of the 
studies on presidential systems. In the beginning of the 1990s, Juan Linz, in his “Perils of 
Presidentialism”, called presidential-PR systems “ineluctably problematic” (Linz, 1990: 56) 
by virtue of the winner-take-all configuration of the presidential elections and the resulting 
zero-sum game and the implications it involved. He had undoubtedly a positive view of 
parliamentary systems and he deemed them to be the most appropriate ones for the new 
democracies that emerged in Latin America during the Third Wave of Democratization. 
Nevertheless, virtually all of the countries  in the region saw a continuation in the institutional 
legacy of strong presidencies and rather weak legislatures, existent before their 
(re)democratization processes had started. 
Few years after Linz’s warnings, a new warning arose in literature. Scott Mainwaring, 
coined a new expression: “the difficult combination”. Studying the specific case of Brazil, he 
contended that the country’s institutional design was inherently problematic: presidentialism, 
democracy and multipartism were difficult to combine. One of the main points of his analysis 
was that “multiparty presidentialism is more likely to produce immobilizing 
executive/legislative deadlock... [and] difficulties of interparty coalition-building” 
(Mainwaring, 1993: 200). Brazil has indeed one of the most fragmented multiparty 
presidential systems in the world, with 24 parties in Parliament today, and is a presidential 
system. As for the third component of Mainwaring's difficult combination, namely 
democracy, the country can be considered a consolidated democracy based on Linz and 
Stepan’s definition (1996): in Brazil, democracy is the only game in townbehaviorally (when 
no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede 
from the state), attitudinally (a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that 
democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life 
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in a society) and constitutionally (governmental and nongovernmental forces alike agree to 
abide to the rule of law) (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 5-6)21.  
What were the conditions that allowed the country to attain such an institutional stability 
and remain a democracy since transition had begun? Literature has focused on different 
aspects of Brazil’s institutional design in the past decade: from the management of cabinet 
portfolios (Amorim Neto, 2002) to the president’s agenda power (Figueiredo and Limongi, 
2000; Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins, 2003), to the importance of pork (Ames, 2001; 
Pereira and Mueller, 2002). 
The Executive Toolbox theory, which is used in this thesis, moves beyond analyzing 
these approaches separately to making an effort in integrating them and trying to add 
“considerations of dynamic endogeneity and context”. The first effort of this theory was to 
“consider jointly the influence of pork and coalition goods on legislative support” (Raile, 
Pereira and Power, 2011: 324, 325). Coalition goods are especially public jobs (from 
Ministerial positions to other important posts in the government structure). These jobs are 
normally distributed in the beginning of his or her mandate, when the president is still 
forming his or her coalition and are considered by the authors as sunk costs, costs that are not 
permanent but paid all-at-once.  
Furthermore, as its name suggests, the theory includes more tools presidents have at their 
disposal to bring equilibrium to the Executive-Legislative relations, besides coalition goods 
and the budgetary prerogatives (which include pork). They are five in total: the president has 
agenda power, budgetary prerogatives, control over the cabinet management and partisan 
powers, alongside the help of informal institutions, which includes his or her popular support 
(Power, 2010). Called the coalitional approach by its proponents, by studying the Brazilian 
case it aims at setting a new start for the study of presidential systems not only in Latin 
American countries, but also in other regions in the world such as Africa and Asia (Chaisty, 
Cheeseman and Power, from Oxford University, discuss it in a still unpublished paper 
presented in February 2011 in the ECPR Summer School on Latin American Politics, 
promoted by the  Salamanca University). 
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 For a very recent discussion on the stability of the regime and the transition to democracy in Brazil, Arturi’s 
(2011) article on “The Democratic Regime in Brazil: Notes for a Research Agenda” is recommended. In it, the 
author discusses the transition of Brazil to democracy and gives discusses briefly on possible threats to Brazilian 
democracy, e.g. its institutional setup with weak parties when it comes to ideology, corruption and the lack of a 
political reform; public safety; human rights; political culture, among others. The author proposes these themes 
as starting points of agendas for future research on the Brazilian case. It has not been published in English yet. 
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The Executive Toolbox theory grounds this work precisely because the debate in 
Brazilian literature presented in the last section can be brought to a new stage if pork is 
analyzed in interaction with other tools the president has. It might have a higher or lower 
relevance when compared to other tools, but they can not be excluded. Since the study needs 
a starting point, it focuses firstly in the analysis of pork in the current Legislative-Executive 
relations in Brazil, but it will rely on qualitative research to continue the debate that started 
based on quantitative research methods and relating it to the other tools in the Executive 
toolbox - especially coalition goods. 
 
3.2.   HYPOTHESES 
 
The execution of individual amendments are a tool used by the president to help ensure 
discipline in her coalition, especially so at the party level. However, two questions need 
further study: to what extent is pork liquidation important when compared with other tools of 
the Executive toolbox? And, is this specific budgetary prerogative of the president used only 
at the party level or is it also used at the individual level in parliament?  
My first hypothesis is that other factors are indeed important to ensure regime stability in 
Brazil, but pork is the most important because many winners can be identified at the same 
time: (1) the Executive, because it can enforce its agenda with a relatively simple decision 
that can be made in short time and at little cost; (2) most members of parliament (especially 
who are in the coalition but also, to a lesser extent, those in the opposition), because pork has 
its importance in electoral terms; (3) municipalities, because it promotes at least redistribution 
of tax incomes in the local level through the hands of MPs, and allow local level politicians to 
demonstrate concrete works. In general, in combination with the other tools, I expect pork to 
be today the most prominent tool in the Executive toolbox. 
Nevertheless, the question of pork at the individual level is also relevant: why are there 
exceptions to the rule that voting with government allows an MP to appropriate more pork? 
Why are there politicians in the opposition that receive pork while there are others in the 
coalition that do not receive? Why is there a gradation in the levels of pork liquidation when 
one compares all appropriations made by all MPs? Here are my suppositions: as the president 
has a kit with different tools to administer and to balance when starting negotiation with 
Congress, also MPs balance the relative importance of the benefits offered by the president. 
All are elected through the same methods, but congressmen have different preferences and 
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priorities. That is why a second hypothesis is in order: MPs answer to different incentives 
according to their preferences; therefore, votes can be negotiated in an individual basis in 
parliament, too, including, but not restricted to, the liquidation of pork in exchange for 
support. This means that the Executive can also offer coalition goods - a job in the 
government, a position in a ministry -, for instance, in exchange for individual votes even of 
representatives from outside the coalition.  
 
3.3.   RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Pork can be measured by the pecuniary value of the individual amendments liquidation. 
These values, by their turn, can be cross-referrenced with individual roll-call votes in 
parliaments, as can be seen in the literature. Both sides in the “fierce debate” use quantitative 
methods to find out whether individual amendments are or are not used in the Executive-
Legislative relations as a tool to find out if they are, indeed, a “political currency”. 
I worked for two years in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. As a deputy’s advisor, 
soon enough I understood that individual amendments might depend on a series of conditions 
in order to be executed: on the technical side, they might depend on the quality of the project 
proposed by local level authorities and on the ministry where they are allocated:some 
ministries liquidate more amendment than others, but the reasons vary); and, on the political 
side, it depends first on the will of the president to be effectively liquidated, as seen in 
previous passages. 
These peculiarities may make the quantitative research methods used so far in literature 
rather limited. My qualitative research to analyze pork in the Executive-Legislative relations 
in Brazil comprises two distinct process of data collection: tracking and analysis of news in 
the media and personal interviews with Brazilian MPs. 
Media reports will be used most importantly as a complementary method to analyze the 
interviews made with MPs. The high number of news collected in the period related to pork, 
totaling more than 250, demonstrates though in itself that the subject is of relevance in the 
Brazilian public debate. Politics is definitely also made of communication. The 
communication about it on the press to later use it in analysis is, therefore, of great value 
when one is using qualitative research methods. 
The second method chosen was to conduct personal interviews with representatives in 
the Brazilian parliament. As Vromen (2010) states: “when we seek to understand or explain 
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how and why a political institution, event, issue, or process came about, we are necessarily 
asking questions that can be answered through using qualitative method. (...) The focus of 
qualitative methods in political science is on detailed, text-based answers that are often 
historical or include personal reflection from participants in political institutions, events, 
issues or process” (Vromen, 2010: 249). “Field research”, i.e., “research based on personal 
interaction with research subjects in their own setting, (...) can and often does make 
contributions to social science that could not occur via other methods of analysis and data 
collection. Field research is often the only source of adequate description of social, economic, 
or political processes that are not evident in other documents” (Woods, 2006: 123), which is 
deemed here to be the case in the individual amendments debate. Quantitative research can 
measure how many amendments were liquidated per representative and compare it to roll-call 
vote record in parliament. It cannot, however, measure how much importance an MP gives to 
pork neither its relative importance compared to other benefits it might get from the 
Executive toolbox. 
 
3.4.  MEDIA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 
For the media analysis, a Google Alert was set up for fifty days, between the 2nd of June 
and the 22th of July 2012. Google alerts are “email updates of the relevant Google results 
(web, news, etc.) based on your queries”22. All occurrences of the terms “emendas” and 
“parlamentares” (“individual” and “amendments”, in Portuguese) that appeared in the news 
were gathered by Google and sent on a daily basis in one electronic message to my personal 
e-mail.  
The period chosen is short, what allows for some concerns regarding the limitations of 
this research. The fifty days time, however, happens exactly during a period just before 
parliamentarian recess. I expected, therefore, high activity in parliament and, consequently, 
many reports on the press about the activities in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. 
The end date of the period was chosen to be the 22nd of July because it is five days after the 
deadline the CMO and Congress had to approve the Budgetary Guidelines Bill (LDO) for 
2012. Once the Bill is approved, parliament enter into recess and news on subjects related to 
it are expect to drop considerably because there is almost no activity in Congress. After the 
period ended, all e-mails were catalogued. 
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 Retrieved from: www.google.com/alerts. Accessed: 08.08.2012 
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From news reports on the media on “individual amendments” (emendas individuais; n = 
269) in the fifty days period from the 2nd of June to the 22nd of July, results were divided in 
four main groups that are of our interest: 
• Individual amendments as an instrument for distributive policy (n = 81); 
• Technical problems faced by members of parliament to liquidate their 
amendments (n = 8); 
• Individual amendments as a bargaining tool (n = 103); 
• Discussion about a mandatory budget (n = 5). 
• The remaining news, the ones that were discharged because did not have direct 
connection with this research could be grouped in three categories of news:  
• Texts that contained the words “individual” and “amendments” but did not refer 
to “individual amendments” (n = 342); 
• Individual amendments made by legislators in State Assemblies (n = 27); 
• Corruption involving individual amendments to the national budget (n = 45)23. 
The sample distribution, excluding all news that included the word “individual” and 
“amendments” but were unrelated to pork, is graphically seen below: 
 
                                                 
23
 This group was quite a substantive one: the sister of a deputy of the Partido da República (Republican Party, 
PR/BA), João Bacelar, taped a conversation with a businesswoman of the construction sector where the later 
said Bacelar bought individual amendments from other MPs in Congress. According to the accusation, he did so 
because he had a construction company himself and the resources sent to constituencies of the deputies he 
allegedly bought the amendments from would be used in public works performed by his company. The reason 
why her sister taped the conversation and brought would be because of a legal proceeding she has against her 
brother.  
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3.5.  INTERVIEWEES’ OPINIONS ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 
Four deputies from four different parties and a senator were interviewed. Of the 
deputies, two are members of parties in the governing coalition (Partido 
Progressista/Progressive Party, PP - center right; and Partido Democrático 
Trabalhista/Democratic Labour Party, PDT - center-left) and two are in the opposition 
(Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira/Social-Democratic Party, PSDB - center-left; and 
Democratas/Democrats, DEM - center-right). The Senator is from a fifth party, also member 
of the coalition, which has the vice-presidency of the country (Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro/Brazilian Democratic Movement Party - PMDB, center); the senator 
was chosen for having a record of never, in 32 years in parliament, having sent pork to his 
constituencies.  
All interviewees are of my home state, Rio Grande do Sul. As I worked during two years 
as an advisor of MP Renato Molling (PP), this facilitated the contact with him for this 
research and, to some extent, with other interviewees as well. I interviewed Deputy Renato 
Molling (PP) and Deputy Vieira da Cunha (PDT) personally while on a train trip between 
Berlin and Frankfurt on the 30th of June. Deputies Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM) and Marchezan 
Jr. (PSDB) and Senator Pedro Simon  (PMDB) were interviewed from the Netherlands via 
Skype, respectively on the 28th of July, on the 6th of August and on the 8th of August. 
Among the limitations of this field research is, in the first place, the very small N. Five 
representatives interviewed is indeed a low number. However, giving time constrains and the 
distance from Brazil, interviewing more MPs was out of hand. Balancing the interviewees 
partisanship between members in the coalition and members in the opposition was a manner 
to get opinions from different sides in the political spectrum. The questions followed a same 
pattern, but were at times not always exactly the same: interviews lasted between twenty and 
thirty minutes; given interviewees agendas, and the fact that most interviews were made over 
the phone, longer conversations were also not possible.  
MPs interviewed: 
• Vieira da Cunha (PDT, coalition party): federal deputy in his second mandate 
(76.818 votes in 2010). Vice-leader of the bloc PSB/PDT/PCdoB/PMN/PRB 
• Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM, opposition party): federal deputy in his third term 
(84.696 votes in 2010). He was party leader of the DEM from November 2009 to 
October 2011. 
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• Nelson Marchezan Jr. (PSDB, opposition party) federal deputy in his first 
mandate (received 92.234 votes in 2010). Vice-leader of the minority in 
Congress. 
• Renato Molling (PP, coalition party) federal deputy in his second term (received 
104.175 votes 2010). He was mayor at the municipality of Sapiranga for two 
mandates (1997-2004). He is currently member of the CMO and president of the 
Rio Grande do Sul State faction in Parliament 
• Pedro Simon (PMDB, coalition party; senator considers himself independent): 
senator in his fourth term (since 1988). In his political career he was city 
councilor, State Representative, Governor, Minister of Agriculture. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR – ANALYSES OF THE RESULTS 
 
Four sections will integrate this Chapter in order to analyze news and interviewees’ 
opinions that were collected. The topics approached will be individual amendments as 
distributive policies; technical issues related to individual amendments; pork in the Executive-
Legislative relations; and a debate about the structure of the Brazilian budget. Every section 
will have three sub-sections: news collection, interviewees’ opinions and preliminary 
conclusions. The latter will be assessed again in the following and final chapter, in light of the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses exposed in the previous chapter. 
 
4.1.  INDIVIDUAL AMENDMENTS AS DISTRIBUTIVE POLICY 
 
 
4.1.1. NEWS SELECTION 
 
News in this section are, actually, no news: the fact that individual amendments benefit 
local constituencies with public works is the very reason why they exist. The pattern 
encountered in such news, though, is different from the pattern found in most of the reports in 
the remainder our of sample. The reports in this section appeared predominantly in regional or 
local newspapers, not in relevant newspapers and never as news published by Press Agencies. 
From a new sporting park worth R$ 195 thousand sent to a city of 14 thousand inhabitants in 
a municipality of the southern Santa Catarina state24 to putting asphalt for R$ 587,500.00 in a 
street of a 15 thousands inhabitants in a municipality in the state Mato Grosso do Sul25; from 
a R$ 200 thousand transferred to build a local health center in a 35 thousand inhabitants city 
in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul26 to a R$ 3 million investments in infrastructure in 
a 120 thousand inhabitants municipality in the northern Acre27. Commonly, all news about 
resources sent by congressmen to municipalities in the form of individual amendments.  
                                                 
24
 Portal Jagquaruana (2012) "Emendas Parlamentares Estadual e Federal Beneficiam Jaguaruna" (Retrieved 
from: http://www.portaljaguaruna.com/v1/colunistas/detalhes/2917) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
25
 Site Municipal de Porto (2012) "André Puccinelli confirma presença no Centenário de Porto Murtinho" 
(Retrieved from: http://www.portomurtinho.ms.gov.br/noticias/geral/1062/andre-puccinelli-confirma-presenca-
no-centenario-de-porto-murtinho) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
26
 Portal de São Luiz (2012) "Executivo Municipal recebe confirmação de Emendas Parlamentares" (Retrieved 
from: http://www.saoluizrs.com.br/noticias/view/id/30/executivo-municipal-recebe-confirmacao-de-emendas-
.html) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
27
 Jornal Correio Popular (2012) "Três bairros serão beneficiados com quase R$ 3 milhões" (Retrieved from: 
http://www.correiopopular.net/LKN/headline.php?n_id=18608&titulo=Tr%EAs) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
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It is telling that the resources do not follow a pattern: in the northern state Piauí, the 
Federal Deputy Iracema Portella of the Progressive Party (PP) reserved two individual 
amendments to the federal budget for cobblestone pavement of streets (R$ 800 thousand) and 
the purchase of equipment for a health center (R$ 250 thousand), totaling more than one 
million reais destined to an 11 thousand inhabitants municipality. The reason for benefitting 
Porto, according to the news28 was to “announce a present” to its people in celebration for the 
small city’s 92nd anniversary. For such a poor city whose GDP per capita is just over R$ 2 
thousand29, these values are astonishingly high.  
Besides the importance these resources mean at the local level, once they are announced 
on the media they give an important visibility to the MP who authored the amendment. Local 
level politicians, likewise, take advantage of the good news and do their best to appear in the 
press: “based on the requests from mayor Julio Fernando [no party mentioned] and vice-
Marco Citadini [no party mentioned], deputies announced: “in this opportunity, the city 
councilor substitute Reni Rodrigues Lopes  [no party mentioned] gave the mayor Mario Meira 
[no party mentioned] a copy30 of the individual amendment of R$ 200 thousand deputy 
[Darcísio] Perondi (PMDB/RS) has sent to the building of a health center in the neighborhood 
Joaquim Nascimento, which was a proposition of his own [referring to city councilor 
substitute Reni Rodrigues Lopes] when he assumed the post as a councilor for a few days in 
the City Council”31. Another example: “The mayor Cyllenêo Pessoa [no party mentioned] 
highlighted the importance of the appropriation of federal resources. ‘It is with these 
resources that we are able to make such necessary public works in our municipalities. Deputy 
Cida Borghetti [PP/PR] is a partner of [the municipality of] Mandaguary, destining 
amendments for the developing and  improvement of our population’s life’, said the mayor”32. 
                                                 
28
 Jornal 180 graus (2012) "Iracema Portela destina mais de 1 milhão em emendas parlamentar para a cidade de 
Porto" (Retrieved from: http://180graus.com/porto/iracema-portela-destina-mais-de-1-milhao-em-emendas-
parlamentar-para-a-cidade-de-porto-537045.html) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
29
 Retrieved from: http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/pibmunicipios/2004_2008/ Accessed: 
23.07.2002 
30
 The “copy” the news refers to is a simple document in paper which the deputy sends from his cabinet in 
Brasília, with an official stamp, telling that the amendment the local politician asked the deputy to make was 
either approved in parliament or liquidated by the government (it is not clear from the media reports). [Note 
from the author] 
31
 Portal de São Luiz (2012) "Executivo Municipal recebe confirmação de Emendas Parlamentares" (Retrieved 
from: http://www.saoluizrs.com.br/noticias/view/id/30/executivo-municipal-recebe-confirmacao-de-emendas-
.html) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
32
 Jornal O Diario (2012) "Deputada Cida Borghetti anuncia recursos para cidades da região" (Retrieved from:  
http://www.odiario.com/blogs/dinizneto/2012/07/02/deputada-cida-borghetti-anuncia-recursos-para-cidades-da-
regiao/) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
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Similar reports are found on a daily basis in a considerable amount of local and regional 
newspapers throughout Brazil. They are normally not present in the internet, but their impact 
in the local level public opinion can be considered very important. Perhaps not so much 
immediately for the author of the individual amendment, but especially for local politicians, 
city councilors and mayors alike. In Brazil, there are local elections every four years 
throughout the 5,565 municipalities of the country (next elections subsequent to the deadline 
of this thesis is October 2012). General elections also occur every four years and include 
elections for state and federal deputies, senators, governors and for the presidency. They take 
place two years after local elections (thus: next general elections will be in October 2014). As 
the vote for federal deputies is personal in Brazil, i.e., the voter votes directly for his or her 
candidate, and federal deputies are normally distant from their constituencies, having city 
councilors and mayors as their supporters in the next elections, telling people how important 
the individual amendment the MP sent was, is a manner to create a link between the deputy 
and his electors.  
This is a generalization: I do not contend that all deputies operate on such basis. Even 
from the news analyzed here, it is not possible to state that the local politicians mentioned will 
“pay back” the individual amendments received by campaigning for the MPs. However, such 
details allows for some discussion about the political practice in Brazil: an individual 
amendment might have both a pecuniary value in reais and a political value in electoral terms. 
An amendment of one million reais sent to a small municipality might represent much in 
monetary terms, but if no local politician becomes a link between the MP and the local voters, 
the electoral importance for the representative in parliament might be reduced. 
 
4.1.2. INTERVIEWEES’ OPINIONS 
 
Regarding the financial importance of individual amendments to municipalities, all 
interviewees agreed upon their considerable importance. Deputy Vieira da Cunha (PDT) 
stressed that “mayors have a major difficulty to use their own budgets for investments and 
depend on transfers from the federal government - especially when they are from small 
municipalities. The MP is, therefore, demanded to make such amendments. Every week we 
receive many mayors in Brasília at our cabinet who come all the way from home to ask for 
public funds. They would not have access to them if it were not for the amendments. 
Normally, they are for small public works, but they are very relevant in showing that there is 
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a good will in public service”. Senator Pedro Simon (PMDB) has similar opinion: “it is true, 
probably a public work a deputy includes in an individual amendment would not be done in 
the municipality if it were not for the amendment. But its liquidation should be mandatory”, 
he stressed, following this same line throughout the interview, since he never sent any 
individual amendment when in Parliament and opposes this system, as will be discussed later. 
As for the electoral connection referred to before, Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM) stated that his 
election was not based on amendments, because his is an “opinion vote”. “But for those 
deputies who depend on party structure to be elected, from mayors, city councilors in the 
local level, they depend 100% on individual amendments to be elected. If I depended on that, 
I would not be reelected”, he asseverated, mentioning that he is currently one of the leaders in 
the opposition and, therefore, could not rely on the execution of his amendments. Renato 
Molling (PP), who was a mayor before becoming a deputy: “individual amendments are the 
main instrument a parliamentarian has to promote his work. Press and [local level] politicians 
want materialistic news to spread, concrete things. Amendments are public works and public 
works mean votes. It is of extreme importance”, also citing local level politicians as a link for 
a representative in the local communities.  
Marchezan Jr. (PSDB) said he cannot tell if amendments are important for re-election 
because he is in the federal parliament for the first time and has just presented his first 
amendments to the budget in 2011: “but I assume they are very important, given the quarrels I 
see in parliament”. Vieira da Cunha (PDT), re-elected in 2010 for his second term, said 
amendments were “practically irrelevant” to him “because the maturation time of an 
amendment is normally superior than the lapse of time a mandate lasts”. However, Cunha 
considers that for those who are two or more terms in parliament, they might be more 
relevant, “because in this case they can show more concrete works to their constituencies”. 
Senator Pedro Simon (PMDB), even though he never sent pork, deemed amendments to be 
“vital” for the re-election of an MP: “imagine he represents a little city in the countryside. If 
in this region he liquidates an amendment for a road connecting three municipalities, even 
though not a big one, for him this work is vital! It may assure his election”. 
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4.1.3. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
Individual amendments may be, at the local level, an essential resource for investments, 
especially for small municipalities. The “electoral connection” pork represents in Brazil is not 
the same for every MP. Deputies and Senators have different audiences they address to, and 
those in the opposition allege that, since the level of liquidation of their amendments is lower, 
they become less important to them. It is interesting to cite, too, that at least other two 
“electoral connections” are found in the Brazilian case. Firstly, pork sent to municipalities 
gives impulse to candidacies of politicians at the local level. Mayors and city councilors 
appear on the press and spread the news to the population that they were co-responsible for 
the pork their municipalities are receiving. Secondly, not only the “electoral connections” 
MP-electorate and Mayor/City Councilor-electorate are facilitated by pork, but in the 
Brazilian federation another one exists, one that connects MPs to their electorate through 
local politicians; thus: MP-Mayor/City Councilor-electorate. 
 
4.2.   TECHNICAL HASSLES FACED BY MPs TO LIQUIDATE 
AMENDMENTS 
 
4.2.1. NEWS COLLECTION 
 
Individual amendments are executed if the president decides to do so; they are not if the 
president decides otherwise. These line was repeated here several times so far. And so it is in 
literature, too. However, there are other variables involved, many times neglected in political 
science. Bureaucratic hassles can mean, both at the federal level as well as at the local level, a 
nightmare for deputies wanting to liquidate their amendments. To start at the central 
government level, the rate of amendments liquidation varies a lot from ministry to ministry. 
Fernando Limongi and Argelina Figueiredo demonstrated it in a table: while the Ministry of 
National Integration liquidated between (1996 and 2001) 61.6% of its amendments, the 
Ministry of Education liquidated only 25.8% (Limongi and Figueiredo, 2005: 762-763). They 
did not get deep into the causes of these differences, repeating only the well-known argument 
that in all ministries the rate of executions for coalition parties was higher than for those in the 
opposition. 
Nevertheless, projects that are funded by federal resources have to be approved by the 
respective ministry in which the funds originate, what in itself involves many bureaucratic 
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procedures which could explain these differences. In order to overcome these bureaucratic 
barriers, for instance, deputies’ advisors may e-mail or phone the ministries or visit the 
departments where the specific project might be stuck several times. Deputies can also get 
personally involved in the process, but they usually do so when an appeal to the minister 
himself seems to be the only alternative left. In the newspaper Correio Popular, for instance, a 
meeting with Brazilian Minister of Defense Celso Amorim was reported. Deputy Marco 
Rogério (PDT/RO), who, together with other deputies of his state, had destined through a 
collective amendment resources for the construction of a military base in his state Rondônia, 
asked for the personal interference of the Minister in this project3334. 
In the story “Government makes all efforts for ministries to liquidate amendments 
promised to deputies”, the minister of Institutional Relations, Ideli Salvatti (PT/SC) 
declaredshe had “convoked ministers to speed up the payments”. When asked how much 
would it be paid in total, she answered the reporter that it would “depend on the efficiency of 
every Ministry. And also of the municipalities”35. Hence, the minister who has the central 
control of the liquidation of amendments alleges that if other ministries fail to do their job, 
even if she had authorized the amendments’ payments it does not necessarily mean that they 
will be automatically liquidated.  
The second part of the answer of the Minister includes municipalities. Pork sent to 
municipalities need to be backed by an official contract between the federal and the municipal 
government in order for the funds to be transferred. If the municipality is registered as 
defaulted, for instance, it is not allowed by law to receive federal funds. This is the case of 
Várzea Grande, in Mato Grosso, where the mayor admits that the debts the municipality has 
are preventing it from receiving federal funds for infrastructure36. In other words, deputies 
may have approved amendments to the federal budget for infrastructure in Várzea Grande, but 
the Ministry will not liquidate the payments while the municipality is at fault. 
Another example that was collected from the news sample came from Mato Grosso do 
Sul, in the Center-West macro-region of the country. Many projects for infrastructure in this 
                                                 
33
 Jornal Correio Popular (2012) "Construção da base do Exército é discutida com ministro da Defesa" 
(Retrieved from: http://www.correiopopular.net/LKN/headline.php?n_id=18437&titulo=Constru%E7%E3o) 
Accessed on 23.07.2012 
34
 The report’s citation is about a collective amendment, but the deputies took the opportunity to ask for the 
Ministry to help in the liquidation of their individual amendments, too. 
35
 Jornal Folha de São Paulo (2012) "Governo faz mutirão para liberar emendas prometidas a parlamentares" 
(Retrieved from: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/1114468-governo-faz-mutirao-para-liberar-emendas-
prometidas-a-parlamentares.shtml) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
36
 Jornal Diário de Cuiabá (2012) "Tião critica falta de apoio a VG" (Retrieved from: 
http://www.diariodecuiaba.com.br/detalhe.php?cod=412456) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
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region have to be analyzed by a decentralized development agency, linked to the federal 
government, - SUDECO (Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Centro-Oeste). If the 
agency fails to analyze and approve projects for infrastructure in municipalities, federal funds 
cannot be transferred. In a meeting with the Minister of Planning, deputies of the State of 
Mato Grosso asked for more analysts for SUDECO to analyze the projects in time. The 
agency was allegedly lacking capacity to analyze all projects from municipalities before the 
2nd of July because of an insufficient quantity of in-house analysts. If not analyzed by that 
date, most of the resources would be lost due to legal restrictions. Senator Decídio Almaral 
(PT/MS) expresses the drama: “I saw many of this amendments being approved, but the 
projects were not. That is, I managed to do the most difficult part and now we cannot go on 
because of bureaucracy. But we will keep working hard to help our mayors in our 
municipalities”37. The total value in amendments for the Center-West region depending on the 
approval of SUDECO totaled R$ 160 million, R$ 60 million only for Mato Grosso do Sul. 
According to this same source, the Ministry would not be able to attend to the requests of the 
deputies before the deadline, and all the resources would in that case be lost. 
 
4.2.2. INTERVIEWEES’ OPINIONS 
 
Renato Molling was the most emphatic about bureaucratic hindrances: “there are some 
ministries that are more bureaucratic then the others. In some it is almost impossible, in others 
is easier [to execute the amendments], but bureaucracy is enormous in the ministries. First we 
have to present the project; then, it has to be analyzed, both by the technical body of Caixa 
Econômica Federal [State Bank] and of the government. This takes all too long! And the 
mayor needs to have his own staff to work on it too, otherwise he might lose the funds”. Not 
only the inefficiency of bureaucracy was mentioned, but also the high costs involved: 
“millions and millions are wasted in phone calls to ministries, to state banks, to 
municipalities... a stressful situation between mayor, deputy, advisors, ministry. I would not 
be surprised if, for a small amendment to the budget, someone said that the bureaucratic cost 
of it is close to 50%. These are definitely expensive public works, and because a small work 
takes so long to finally get started, it is also an illusion for the people. The system works like 
that, but it is too stressful”.  
                                                 
37
 Jornal MS Notícias (2012) "Bancada pede a ministra liberação de recursos para MS" (Retrieved from: 
http://www.msnoticias.com.br/?p=ler&id=87808) Accessed on 23.07.2012 
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However, before the amendment is indeed promised to be executed, according to the 
deputy, it is the government who decides if the ministry will or will not be allowed to 
liquidate it: “Ministries do not have any autonomy to liquidate any payment; in this sense, the 
work of the MP is very little relevant. Who prioritizes is the government. It does not matter if 
you find the project interesting: if the government prioritizes it, it will be liquidated. If it does 
not, then it will not”. Therefore, the MP’s individual amendment, according to Renato 
Molling (PP), has to first be prioritized by government and, if the appropriation of the 
resources is authorized by the Executive, the bureaucratic via crucis can begin. 
On bureaucracy, Vieira da Cunha (PDT) also said that “bureaucracy is overwhelming 
and, normally, municipalities do not have a technical body sufficiently prepared to present 
projects with the detail the Executive requires”. Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM) said, however, that 
the importance of a deputy’s advisor in parliament, that goes up and down to Ministries in 
order to use his political network to make the process move is not as important as it used to be 
in the past: “the government centralized everything and, with the use of the internet and 
software to send the documents to Brasília, the well-connected assistant of the deputy is 
becoming a specimen in extinction”. Renato Molling (PP), the only one among the 
interviewees who was a mayor himself before becoming a deputy, made a point that, indeed, 
bureaucracy is worse because of the poor quality of projects from the local level than because 
of political reasons: “the mayor comes to our cabinet and says he wants an amendment - but 
he does not even know what he wants it for! If he sent projects with more consistency, we 
would help them with much more willingness (...). I do my best to see the amendments 
executed. If the mayor respects himself and his position, he has to have a good in-house 
technical body and respect all deadlines”.  
 
4.2.3. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Executive centralizes the decision whether amendments should or not be liquidated. 
However, once their execution is authorized, bureaucracy in the federal and in the local level 
influence on the effective transfer of the funds. This means that even amendments whose 
payment is authorized by the Executive may in the end not be appropriated. The stories 
collected on the media and the opinions from interviewees demonstrate that bureaucratic 
hassles are far from infrequent. 
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4.3.   INDIVIDUAL AMENDMENTS IN THE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE 
RELATIONS  
 
4.3.1. NEWS COLLECTION 
 
By far the largest of all news groups created from the reports’ sample, the use of 
individual amendments for bargaining in congress is neither an unknown phenomenon in 
Brazil for the press nor for the public opinion. 103 news articles in the fifty-day period, or 
38% of the sample, accounted for the quarrels in Congress about the liquidation of 
amendments as their bottom line. In the beginning of the chosen period for this sampling, 
time started to run short for MPs: the electoral period for local elections would start in the 7th 
of July. Therefore, according to the electoral law, individual amendments could not be 
executed from this date until election day, i.e., from the 7th of July to the 7th of October.  
In the period considered, dissatisfaction with the Executive because it was not 
liquidating individual amendments came first, from within the supporting coalition in 
parliament - not from the opposition. On the 11th of June, Agência Estado published that 
“Coalition pressures for public funds on the eve of electoral campaigns”. According to the 
report, one of the mouthpieces of the dissatisfaction was Deputy Lincoln Portela (PR/MG), 
leader of one of the coalition parties in the Chamber, the Party of the Republic, PR. “‘Mayors 
risk facing legal procedures because, for lack of funds, they are not paying the construction 
companies. The government is not transferring the resources!”38. The report also informs that 
president Dilma Rousseff (PT) was more worried about “themes related to the international 
economic crisis than with politics in Congress” and that a deputy from the coalition, under 
anonymity, stated that “soon enough, when the economy starts to crash, the government will 
need the Congress and will depend on its coalition”39. The government had promised earlier 
in 2012 to execute at least half of the individual amendments of the MPs40. In reality, though, 
just about 10% of them were executed during the first six months41.  
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 Estadão Online (2012) "Base pressiona por verba às vésperas da campanha eleitoral" (Retrieved from:  
http://estadao.br.msn.com/ultimas-noticias/base-pressiona-por-verba-às-vésperas-da-campanha-eleitoral) 
Accessed on 23.07.2012 
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 Estadão Online (2012) "Base pressiona por verba às vésperas da campanha eleitoral" (Retrieved from: 
http://estadao.br.msn.com/ultimas-noticias/base-pressiona-por-verba-às-vésperas-da-campanha-eleitoral) 
Accessed on 23.07.2012 
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 Agência Câmara de Notícias (2012) "Comissão de Orçamento vota nesta tarde o parecer final da LDO" 
(Retrieved from: http://www2.camara.gov.br/agencia/noticias/ADMINISTRACAO-PUBLICA/422197-
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 Estadão Online (2012) "Base fica com 90% da verba para emendas" (Retrieved from: 
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The same Press Agency published on the 3rd of July another news: “To calm the 
coalition, government reserves up to R$ 2.7 billion for individual amendments” . The 
strategy, according to the report, was to execute R$ 4.5 million for each of the 594 MPs 
(deputies and senators) before the subsequent Friday, 6th, because of the aforementioned 
electoral law restrictions42. The promising news on the media, however, did not calm the 
opposition. Already expecting an unequal treatment, the opposition blocked voting in 
Congress during the first week of July through regimental maneuvers, demanding the 
Executive to liquidate their individual amendments if it wanted to approve its bills in 
parliament that week.  
Given the current small percentile representation of the opposition in parliament, 
emptying parliament in protest was only possible with the help of dissatisfied members of the 
governing coalition: “The DEM admitted that it will obstruct the session because the 
economic area of the government did not attend its pleas. ‘(...) Deputies of the coalition also 
agree with us’, according to Chico Alencar [PSOL]”43. In the first six days of July, though, 
only about R$ 150 million in individual amendments were in fact liquidated (which accounts 
for a little more than R$ 250 thousand in average per deputy, much less than the R$ 4.5 
million promised). Of this value, the opposition received an amount of about 9%, while its 
representation percentage in Congress is roughly twice as large:  in the Chamber of Deputies, 
the opposition has 17% of the seats and in the Senate somewhat over 19%44. 
The government was unable to approve the bills it wanted to pass in Parliament that first 
week of July because of the joint blockade its supporters and opponents on the Lower House 
floor promoted, and had to wait for the following week to approve them. In the meanwhile, 
the Executive modified its previous understanding of the Electoral Law based on a recent 
legal opinion from the Office of theSolicitor-General (Advocacia-Geral da União): the 
transfer of resources from the treasury to municipalities remained forbidden during the 
eletoral period, but the liquidation of amendments could be at least authorized according to 
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this new interpretation45. In other words, deputies could have a documented proof that their 
individual amendments were going to be paid, albeit the deposit transfers would only be made 
later on, after elections in October. During a period of electoral campaign, having at least the 
written “proof” that the resources will effectively be transferred to a municipality’s treasury is 
already a political asset in the hands of an MP. 
During the following days, from the 10th to the 17th of July, government had to put 
extra effort to approve its agenda in Congress. Two bills in special, PM 563 and PM 56446, 
both part of the Plano Brasil Maior (Plan Bigger Brazil) accounted for R$ 10 billion in tax 
incentives for the national industry in a time of international crisis. If the LDO was not 
approved by the 17th of July, Congress would not enter in recess. The aforementioned bills 
had to be approved in such a case by the 1st of August - an impossible task for the Executive 
during the second half of July: most MPs would presumably be either on vacations or, most 
possibly, in their constituencies campaigning for their local candidates or for themselves, in 
case they were candidates for mayoral posts. 
The strategy of promising the liquidation of amendments went on, but during the second 
week of July members of the coalition and of the opposition blocked the vote and emptied the 
floor. Again, thus, no agreement was reached: the government promises of liquidation of 
amendments were not kept and nothing was voted in parliament neither on the Tuesday, 10th, 
nor on the Wednesday, 11th of July 201247. Members of parties in the governing coalition 
joined the opposition once morein the obstruction protest against the Executive not only 
because they were dissatisfied with the unpaid amendments: MPs of the Party of the Republic 
(PR), for instance, were still malcontented with the fact that the party had lost the Transport 
Ministry: the former minister, Alfredo Nascimento (PR/AM - now back in the Senate), had to 
stepdown due to corruption suspicions; representatives of the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) 
were bothered that the president had appointed a new Labor Minister in the party’s quota who 
was not of the party’s preference, even though he is a member of the PDT; and MPs of the 
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Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and of the Social Christian Party (PSC) were disaffected because 
they claimed they should be ingratiated with one of the 38 existent ministerial positions, too48.  
These are, clear examples of the influence that coalition goods - or their allegedly 
maldistribution - can have in an MP’s or in a party’s decision to value more pork when 
bargaining with government, as it has been the case of the dissatisfied coalition parties and 
MPs. Ronaldo Caiado (DEM/GO), one of the leaders of the opposition, stated the situation 
clearly: “‘there are 513 federal deputies and the opposition does not have more than 90 
deputies. It’s math: 90 deputies cannot block any voting, neither the LDO voting, nor the MPs 
voting. We cannot be blamed for that’. (...) Caiado said that “the government has been 
treating the Federal Budget as an electoral instrument, choosing parties and MPs that will get 
their amendments paid and, this way, the opposition does not get anything”49. 
Finally, to overcome this situation and approve the budget before the 17th of July 
deadline, a new leading actor appeared in the news. The President of the Chamber, Deputy 
Marco Maia (PT/RS) traced two strategies: he sent telegrams to all deputies where he 
declared that their salaries would be cut if they did not have a good reason (e.g. health 
problems) for not going to Brasília the following week, the third week of July50; and he 
volunteered to be the guarantor of an agreement to be made between the Executive and the 
Legislatureregarding the liquidation of the individual amendments. The agreement reached by 
the President of the House was that the Executive would liquidate, by the end of July, R$ 3 
million per MP, what accounted for R$ 500 thousand more than what was demanded by the 
opposition, this to “compensate the delay in the liquidations”51. Party leaders agreed upon the 
proposal at 21h15 of the 16th of July in Maia’s cabinet and, at 22h20, the plenary of the 
Chamber of Deputies approved PM 563, PM 564 and the LDO, which was ratified next day, 
the 17th, by a joint session of Congress, allowing recess to officially begin. No news on 
“individual amendments”, relevant for this study, figured in the subsequent (and last) days of 
our sample. 
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4.3.2. INTERVIEWEES’ OPINIONS 
 
The MPs interviewed for this research were unanimous: the Executive uses individual 
amendments as a bargaining instrument. No one disagreed with the statement that MPs in the 
coalition receive more pork than those in the opposition; furthermore, statements about MPs 
that are able to liquidate amendments on an individual basis also appeared: “many times, 
deputies that are not in the coalition also liquidate amendments. He [the MP] asks the 
Executive to liquidate his amendments and sells his vote”, was the assesment ofPedro Simon 
(PDMB). Renato Molling (PP): “one has to be in the coalition [to receive more pork] but also 
to vote with the government. If [the MP] is in the coalition but keeps criticizing the 
government, liquidating his amendments will be harder”. Marchezan Jr. (PSDB): 
“amendments are prioritized for those who are in the coalition and, within parties, according 
to their roll-call votes record:the more you vote with the government, the more pork you get”. 
However, as learned from literature, there are examples of deputies who vote against the 
government and, even so, manage to liquidate their amendments, while there are also deputies 
in the opposition who manage to get more amendments liquidated their peers in the coalition. 
According to Marchezan Jr. (PSDB), “the MP in the coalition votes against the government 
because it didn’t liquidate his amendment. He sends the Executive a message: if you don’t 
pay me, I will continue to vote against you. This is the rule”. Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM) 
sustained that cases in which MPs in the opposition receive more pork than MPs in the 
coalition are very rare: “amendments are fundamentally paid only after agreements are 
reached between party leaders. If it weren’t for the obstruction in the Chamber’s floor and the 
bargaining with government, nothing would be paid [to the opposition]”. Renato Molling 
(PP): “there are deputies that, even if belonging to parties in the opposition, are well-
connected with authorities and policy makers in the Executive. Besides, the government 
liquidates amendments of the opposition as well to keep decorum”. 
The interviewees gave different relative importance to pork as a bargaining tool. Renato 
Molling (PP) called it “the first of all tools. When individual amendments are liquidated, the 
relations between Executive and Legislature are peaceful; when they are not, it is the 
contrary”. Nelson Marchezan Jr. (PSDB) said that it is a tool the government uses to “buy” its 
coalition, but added patronage: “the amendment is a currency: the MP sells his principles, his 
vote, his opinion in exchange for amendments; but also for public jobs, which are other tool”. 
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Senator Pedro Simon (PMDB) preferred to balance pork with patronage as well. He deemed 
pork to be “the first of all tools, seconded by patronage” only to, in his next sentence, declare 
that “public jobs are the first [tool] sometimes [because] the party wants a public job, a 
position in government, to support the government (...) [and] the Executive has many 
companies, a mountain of public jobs to offer, money that is available through these channels, 
positions at Petrobras [Brazilian State Oil Company] and at the Banco do Brasil [Brazilian 
State Bank]. The allied party decides who is going to be appointed”. Vieira da Cunha (PDT) 
also balanced pork with patronage as the most important tools in a “tit for tat” system. Onyx 
Lorenzoni (DEM) was the only one to grant a lower relevance to pork:.According to him, the 
main tool government uses is patronage, pork is an “additional” tool: “in the first Lula term 
the main tool was the Mensalão52; from Lula’s second term [until now], [the main tool] has 
been the feudalization of the president’s ministerial cabinet. And the ministers oblige the MPs 
of their parties to vote in favor of the Executive’s proposals”. 
Finally, one of the questions made to the representatives interviewed was copied exactly 
as it was found on Limongi and Figueiredo’s (2007: 5) article: “if individual amendments are 
so decisive for their political careers, why do they [the MPs] not rebel agains the low rates of 
executions”? Senator Pedro Simon (PDMB): “they do rebel, yes; at this very moment [the 
senator was in Brasília, August 8th] deputies are refusing to vote at all if their amendments 
are not liquidated”. Vieira da Cunha (PDT) was of similar opinion: “they rebel, and do it a lot.  
Outraged speeches by MPs are frequent, denouncing the non execution of amendments. There 
are initiatives to make the budget mandatory, but the Executive has the majority and such 
initiative would create a problem for the government”. Renato Molling (PP) is of the opinion 
that a rebellion can only be made with a large number of deputies, and “the Executive is very 
strategic: it executes more amendments of party leaders” in order to prevent rebellions from 
happening. The MPs in the opposition Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM) and Marchezan Jr. (PSDB) 
said, respectively, that there is no space for rebellion because government has “a vaste 
majority of four fifths of the parliament” and because “many MPs receive federal funds 
through other channels, not only via individual amendments. Even so, about half of the 
individual amendments proposed by MPs in the coalition are liquidated”. 
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4.3.3. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
The use of pork as a tool for bargaining in Congress was bluntly exposed in the news 
section: in order to approve the projects that were in its interest, the Executive had to promise 
time and again the liquidation of amendments to deputies. According to the news, the 
opposition was the catalyzer of a rebellion. The obstruction in parliament, though, was only 
possible because of the dissatisfaction of MPs in the coalition. This dissatisfaction, by its turn, 
had origin not only on the failure or refusal by the Executive of liquidating amendments for 
members of the coalition, but also because of its refusal for providing enough coalition goods 
to its supporters, such as were the cases mentioned in the news related to parties as the PDT, 
PR, PSC and PTB.  
The balance between the different tools the president has in her toolbox to administrate 
the Executive-Legislative relations was not right, leading to a deadlock. In order to bring 
stability back to the system and regain confidence in parliament, it is reasonable to suppose - 
even though it is not explicit in any news - that the president used yet another tool in her kit to 
rebalance the situation: her partisan powers. The direct participation of the President of the 
Chamber of the Deputies in the last days, whom is of the same party of the president, was 
indispensable for the Executive to recover its credibility and, finally, approve the PMs on the 
Chamber’s floor.  Were the President of the Chamber not of the same party of the President, it 
is legitimate to suppose that the outcomes would be very different. In other words: the 
strategy it is contended here that the president used to exert her partisan powers, granting the 
President of the Chamber the position of guarantor of an agreement between Executive and 
Congress, would not be possible if he, were of an opposition party. 
As for the interviews, there are many indications coming from the deputies that 
individual amendments are a political currency also at the individual level. All the 
interviewees agree that bargaining through the liquidation of amendments is the modus 
operandi of the Executive and one of its most important tools, if not the most important, at the 
party level: parties in the coalition do receive more pork than those in the opposition; however 
impossible it has been for political scientists to establish a similar correlation at the individual 
level with quantitative methods, it is telling that all five interviewees, regardless of being in 
the coalition or in the opposition, have the same opinion that individual transactions, even if 
only to some extent or with some MPs, also happen.   
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4.4.   THE DEBATE ABOUT A MANDATORY BUDGET  
 
4.4.1. NEWS COLLECTION 
 
Only five news were classified as pertaining to this fourth and last group of news, i.e., 
those about the fact that the Brazilian budget depends on the president’s decision to be 
effectively appropriated. It reveals, however, that the discussions on whether the budget in 
Brazil should be a mandatory one instead of only authorizing expenditures by the Executive is 
existent. One of the reports accounts for a law proposal (PLP 174/2012) authored by the 
Federal Deputy Nilson Leitão (PSDB/MT) in which it is devised that amendments in the areas 
of education, health and public safety should be executed immediately, even when revenues 
are lower than the estimates. The proposal also determines that no expenditure can be 
cancelled without approval in Congress if revenues are equal or higher than the estimates in 
the Budget Bill previously approved53.  
Federal Deputy of the opposition, Marcus Pestana (PSDB), defended in an interview to 
the newspaper Correio Braziliense that individual amendments should be mandatory. “‘The 
situation today is humiliating because the amendments are used to manipulate the relations 
between the powers [Legislative and Executive]. I was coordinator of the amendments 
committee this year and I perceived this hardship from very close. We had party leaders in the 
coalition that executed from R$ 8 million to R$ 9 million while other MPs did not execute 
anything’, said Pestana”54.  
Another report is an interview with the president of the CMO of 2012, Deputy Paulo 
Pimenta (PT). He says two times that the budget in Brazil is not mandatory, but does not give 
an opinion about it, neither defending a change in the system nor its continuation. He limits 
himself to saying that “if it isn’t through dialogue [between Executive and Legislative], 
frustrations might arise because of a public work that does not become a reality”. 
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4.4.2. INTERVIEWEES’ OPINIONS 
 
All representatives interviewed were of the opinion that the federal budget should be   
mandatory. However, regarding the execution of the amendments, their opinions varied since 
some contende they should not even exist. Senator Pedro Simon (PMDB), called the 
amendments in the current Brazilian political system “indecent and immoral” and said that the 
budget in Brazil is a “science fiction piece”. “Individual amendments should not exist; once 
they do exist, they should be always executed”. Nelson Marchezan Jr. (PSDB) stated that 
“ideally, this system should come to an end. It is not for the Legislative Power to give out 
resources as if it were doing a favor. There should be a planning in the Executive, something 
that does not exist today. If there were a meticulous planning behind the [allocation of the] 
individual amendments, attentive to the real necessities, then individual amendments whose 
liquidation were mandatory might be positive”. Vieira da Cunha was of similar opinion: 
“actually, individual amendments should not exist. They distort the real aim of a 
parliamentarian activity. It brings more political onus than gains, because of the hellish 
bureaucracy involved”. Onyx Lorenzoni: “Brazil has a parliamentarist Constitution 
[combined] with a presidential republic, and the non mandatory execution of the budget is one 
of the bad consequences from this combination. If Brazil had a parliamentarian system, it 
would have been better”. Renato Molling added that the local level in Brazil should have 
more funds directly available: “I think municipalities should have enough money to take their 
own decisions on where to invest in the first place”.  
 
4.4.3. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section has a normative character: it deals more with what should be than with what 
is. It is interesting to take notice of the opinions of the representatives interviewed: whether 
they are in the opposition or in the coalition, regardless of their opinions about the efficacy of 
individual amendments as distributive policies, they look all very critically about the manner 
how the system works today. It might be natural for a deputy or a senator to criticize the way 
the system is set, after all, most politicians start their careers saying their intention is to bring 
change to the status quo. The current status quo regarding individual amendments, though, 
may lead one to think that MPs would not like to change it since, as seen, they are an 
important tool for their elections and they are also important as a distributive policy.  
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Notwithstanding, all interviewed manifested a clear desire of bringing a change to this 
tool used in Brazil in the Executive-Legislative relations. The “Executive toolbox” theory 
states that the way the Brazilian system works is how stability has been possible in this young 
democracy. Therefore, a good conclusion to this sections are the following statements from 
senator Pedro Simon: “it is a very negative formula, very bad, but it has, in some manner, 
helped to make the country move forward. It is a very bad practice, a ‘tit for tat’ practice, ‘I 
give you something expecting something from you in return’; something very bad under a 
democratic perspective. However, if it weren’t for that, I do not know what would be of 
Brazil”. When I heard these words coming from the senator’s mouth suggesting that the 
situation could be worse in Brazil if it were not for the individual amendments system, what is 
more, from a senator whom in his whole political career had never had destined one single 
amendment, battling against them as a “Don Quixote” in his own words,  I tried to get a more 
straightforward answer from him. “What would have been of Brazil, Mr. Senator?”, I insisted. 
“If it were not for that, I do not know what would be happening”, was his enigmatic answer. 
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5. CONCLUSION  
 
 “After three days installed in the cabinet of the 
leadership of the government in the Senate, the Minister of 
Institutional Relations, Ideli Salvatti, told Globo that demands 
from allied senators such as the executions of individual 
amendments and appointment for public jobs are ‘legitimate, 
just and republican’ in negotiatians to assure sufficient votes 
for important bills for the Executive”55  
 
Pork in Brazil as a tool used by government to discipline its coalition is not only very 
important: from the Executive toolbox standpoint, as seen in the news and the interviews 
collected, it is one of the most relevant. As expected, its relative importance in comparison to 
other tools, namely agenda power, coalition goods, partisan powers and informal institutions, 
is pronounced. If one is to judge from the news collected, the president’s budgetary 
prerogatives are the most important of all tools, being cited far more times in our research 
during the fifty days period the Google Alert was turned on. The fact that the research is on 
“individual amendments”, not on “coalition goods”, is evidently determinative for the news 
on pork used as a bargaining method by the Executive to have such a predominance in our 
sample.  
Nevertheless, had I chose for “cargos” (public jobs) or “cargos no governo” (public jobs 
in government) as the “tool” this research were to be about, would the relative importance of 
“individual amendments” in the toolbox seem less pronounced? Most probably, yes, it would. 
However, I would expect the size of such a sample to be much smaller because coalition 
goods are normally less publicly negotiated and because they are normally more important as 
“sunk costs” in the beginning of a mandate or during a period of reorganization of the cabinet. 
These statements, though, can only be confirmed with future research using the same 
methodology used here, except for adding a second term or combinations of terms to the one 
already used (i.e., “emendas” “parlamentares”).  
Notwithstanding, this work’s findings allow us to suppose the correlation between both 
tools, budgetary prerogatives and coalition goods, would remain visible: the obstruction the 
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opposition was able to make in the Chamber of Deputies’ floor before mid-term recess in 
2012 was only made possible because of dissatisfaction of the government’s own allies with 
an alleged uneven distribution of coalition goods. In other words, an unbalanced use of the 
tools at the president’s disposal was in great deal responsible for the lack of agreement in the 
Parliament’s floor. One might suppose that, if all parties in the coalition, especially so their 
leaderships, were content with the distribution of public jobs within the governing structure, 
the opposition would have had much less chance to organize alone a rebellion in the Chamber 
of Deputies.  
I expected pork to be the most important tool to ensure regime stability because of the 
many winners in a process that spreads money around. These winners included the Executive, 
most members of parliament, and municipalities. But, the data collected for this research and 
the interviews show that the answer is not as straightforward. Firstly, because other tools also 
have importance. Pork is maybe more pronounced at this moment, but one could expect that, 
during periods of reorganization of the government cabinet, something that is not unusual in 
Brazilian political culture, individual amendments may lose importance to public jobs, for 
instance. Also, rampant bureaucracy and increasing disillusion with the individual 
amendments liquidations system account for growing dissatisfaction in the governing 
coalition – not to mention the opposition, who receives less pork either way.  
Moreover, constant broken promises from the Executive might be eroding the whole 
individual amendments system. In the end of the week prior to the 13th of August 2012, this 
thesis’ due date56, the Chamber of Deputies refrained from voting on any important bill for 
the Executive57. It was the second week since the end of recess and MPs refused to 
collaborate with government again. The reason for the rebellion was that the agreement 
reached in the previous month, the one which the President of the Chamber was the guarantor 
of, had not been respected again, and deputies and senators were now demanding the 
immediate execution of their amendments. Bureaucracy can account for many hassles – and 
one of the excuses government is giving now for not keeping its word is the general strikes in 
public service in the federal bureaucracy58. Projects that depended on technical approval of 
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Ministries in Brasília and were funded by individual amendments would probably take longer 
to be executed now, according to the Executive.  
Therefore, the three winners I listed – Executive, MPs and municipalities – seem more 
and more less like winners and more like losers, very mucho so at least in terms of time and 
energy spending. The tools that ensure regime stability in Brazil seem to be unbalanced. Or 
not right tuned by the president, allowing for constant and  immense quarrels in every 
important vote in Congress. 
Individual victors in the process are hard to identify, but it is not possible to say they do 
not exist. The liquidation of amendments in exchange for votes at the individual level is, 
according to the MPs interviewed, something that does indeed happen. Political scientists 
were not able to agree on this specific topic yet. Notwithstanding, if five interviewees is a 
small sample, arguably too few for statistical significance, the fact that all of the MPs were 
positive about the existence of such transactions at the individual level should sound as an 
incentive for future and new research in this direction. Perhaps a greater quantity of more 
detailed questionnaires and interviews with staff and government officials could impart 
greater statistical rigor to the case and include new opinions also from outside Parliament. 
Finally, all these factors have contributed to an ongoing debate about the structure of the 
Brazilian budget, which is not mandatory. However, whether a change in its fundamental 
characteristics is to be welcomed or not – changing, thus, the Executive Toolbox 
fundamentally and excluding most, if not all, of the president’s budgetary prerogatives -, it is 
for future research to tell.  
I explained to a Dutch student of History interested in my thesis’ research topic what 
pork in Brazilian politics is and how the Executive enforces discipline in the coalition through 
the liquidation of a greater amount of individual amendments to its allies. He told me he 
understood the point very well: “the Executive buys the votes of its allies by cheaply bribing 
its coalition with public funds”, he said. Politicians in Brazil use to take advantage of the 
existing system, sending “benefits” to constituencies; political scientists study the impact of 
individual amendments and deem them important for the stability of the existent presidential 
regime. Journalists expose the bargaining transactions from within and the Brazilian reader 
seems to take it for natural. Given this last comment from the Dutch student and all 
bargaining methods exposed in the last 40 some pages, perhaps it is about time to ask how 
positively – or negatively – have these “tit for tat” practices impacted in Brazil’s democratic 
institutions. 
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ANNEX 
 
FROM LITTLE POUCHES TO THE BRAZILIAN BUDGET 
 
A national budget, a document that is worth hundreds of billions of dollars in dozens 
of countries in the world, owes its name ironically to a pouch used in medieval ages by the 
French to keep their coins safe, le bouget. Actually, a little pouch: a bougette. Hence, 
budget59. This paradox between the size of a country’s budget and the diminutiveness of a tiny 
coins pouch, is not similar but quite to the little importance the study of budgetary processes 
enjoys in the political sciences: strikingly, being the budget the main tool to solve the impasse 
originated with the lack of order in His Majesty’s, the King of England John Lackland, 
finances in the 13th century, is far from enough studied in the political sciences; especially so 
given the importance this document had for the origin of modern states and to today’s 
relevance of budgets for any political system, from local to national to international.  
Starting with History, it was the Magna Carta (1215) that first defined that the 
Kingdom’s budget should be controlled by a “common counsel”, giving origin to the modern 
idea of parliament.  In fact, the Great Charter of the Liberties of England is considered by 
students of political sciences the most ancient document when it comes to a documented 
beginning of liberal ideas in Europe and the start of what later would be called the 
bureaucratic state that Weber; and which bore the foundations of the rule of law. 
In its article 12, the Magna Carta clearly announces that “[n]o scutage60 or aid shall be 
imposed in our kingdom unless by common counsel of our kingdom, except for ransoming 
our person, for making our eldest son a knight, and for once marrying our eldest daughter, and 
for these only a reasonable aid shall be levied. Be it done in like manner concerning aids from 
the city of London”61. To define how this common counsel should look like, how it would be 
composed and how it would take its decisions, the article 14 stated that “to obtain the 
common counsel of the kingdom about the assessing of an aid (except in the three cases 
                                                 
59
 It is believed that at the time the word was first used, in old French, “one’s entire wealth could be contained 
within” a bougette. In: How a bougette became a budget. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2004/mar/14/observercashsection.theobserver6. See also: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2953319/A-Budget-history.html 
60
 Definition by Encyclopedia Britannica: (scutage from Latin scutum, “shield”), in feudal law, payment made 
by a knight to commute the military service that he owed his lord. A lord might accept from his vassal a sum of 
money (or somehting else of value, often a horse) in lieu of service on some expedition. The system was 
advatageous to both sides and grew rapidly with the expansion of money economy in Europe in the 12th and 
13th centuries. Retrieved from: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scutage?s=t Accessed: 20.05.2012. 
61
 “Our” is the king’s, as he was the signer of the document.  
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aforesaid) or of a scutage, we will cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots, 
earls and greater barons, individually by our letters - and, in addition, we will cause to be 
summoned generally through our sheriffs and bailiffs all those holding of us in chief - for a 
fixed date, namely, after the expiry of at least forty days, and to a fixed place; and in all letters 
of such summons we will specify the reason for the summons. And when the summons has 
thus been made, the business shall proceed on the day appointed, according to the counsel of 
those present, though not all have come who were summoned”. The regular gathering of a 
group of representatives to debate the destine of the taxes collected in the kingdom evolved to 
the present form of a written bill presented in parliament, who approves it for the next 
(financial) year. 
These historical evolutions can be pointed out in three different moments in three 
different countries: from 1822, in England, the Ministry of Finance opened the budget before 
parliament and made public the revenues and expenditures of every financial year62; in 
France, it was after the authoritarian years of Napoleon, from 1831, that the parliament would 
exercise fully control over the budget. According to Burkhead, some of the main budgetary 
principles valid to the date were consolidated then: the budget as a yearly-based bill; the 
voting of the budget before the beginning of the financial year; the universality of the budget, 
including all financial estimates for the following year; and the non-bonding of specific 
revenues to specific expenditures; and, in the US, it was by 1921, with the Budget and 
Accounting Act, that it was established that the budget bill should be written by the Executive 
and that the proposal should be approved in the same year and become law (Burkhead, 1971 
In: Gontijo, 2004: 3-4). 
As for what budgeting today indeed is, a good definition is that “[b]udgeting is 
translating financial resources into human purposes” and that “some way must be found to 
apportion available funds among competing people and purposes. Given the infinite variety of 
human desires the budget of a collectivity (like a government) can never be just one thing but 
must be many” (Wildawsky, 1975: 3). To define what should and what should not be in a 
budget, however, politics is necessary, and that is the following comment of the author: “If 
politics is regarded as the conflict over whose preferences are to prevail in the determination 
of policies, then the budgets records the outcomes of this struggle. Let us then conceive 
budgets as attempts to allocate financial resources through political processes to serve 
                                                 
62
 As his papers were inside a black leather briefcase and he literally opened it to take them out and read it before 
the MPs, Burkhead considers this might be the explanation for the origine of the expression “to open the 
budget”, as it comes from French bourge, bourgette, as explained above. 
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differing human purposes” (Idem: 5).  
Finally, as the history of the evolution of the budgetary process varies from country to 
country, and the same can be said about the way it is composed, i.e., that it depends on the 
peculiar political processes to take shape, also the way the budget is introduced in parliament 
is different from country to country - or from political system to political system. “In some 
legislatures all proposals must formally be initiated by the legislature (the US), while in others 
the legislature has no formal ability to independently initiate proposals (the European Union). 
Most political systems fall somewhere between these two extremes” (Kreppel, 2011: 128). 
The following part of this chapter will study in detail the Brazilian budgetary process. 
 
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS IN BRAZIL 
 
The Brazilian budgetary process was organized differently through the times. When 
Brazil was still an Empire and a new country who just became independent from Portugal 
(7th of September 1822), its first Constitution was granted by the emperor, D. Pedro I. It 
established that he, the emperor, through its Minister of Finances, had the prerogative to draft 
the budget bill and introduce it to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Senate. On these 
Houses depended the approval of the bill and, exclusively, the creation of new taxes. With the 
Constitution of 1891, approved during thus during the second year of the Republic63, the 
whole process of drafting the budget bill went to the Legislature. However, the Minister of 
Finances was called to Parliament to give clarifications. In the end, in spite of the fact that, 
formally, it was for the Congress to draft the bill, with its councils it was the Executive who 
was leading the process. Besides, with the Republic states became more autonomous and 
were freer to organize their own budgets. 
In 1934, during the first Getúlio Vargas term, Brazil had a new constitution that altered 
sensitively bill proposal system again, now to a co-participation form. The president would 
draft the bill and introduce it to Congress, while  Congress would approve it but could amend 
it in any way it deemed necessary. Three years later, with the rise of the dictatorial New State 
(Estado Novo) in 1937, Vargas would write a new granted Constitution, this time centralizing 
the whole budgetary process in the hands of the Executive. 
In 1946, with Brazilian democratization that started one year before, the brazilian budget 
was jointly drafted again, but the power deputies and senators had to amend was actually 
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 Brazil was proclaimed a Republic by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca in the 15th of November 1889. 
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abused as time passed: in 1959, 8,572 amendments were made to the original proposal; in 
1963, this number reached to almost incredible 100 thousand. Nevertheless, the budgetary 
principles already established in many countries, were now also part of the Brazilian budget: 
the unity, universality, exclusivity and specificity. In 1964, a new institutional change 
occurred in Brazil: the democratic period was not even twenty years old and a coup d’état was 
proclaimed. The military were now in power and, three years later, had a new Constitution for 
the country. The power to amend the budget, already reduced by the military through statutes, 
was totally abolished according to the country’s new Constitution every time it meant new 
and unforeseen expenditures. The Legislature only had to approve the budget presented by the 
Executive. 
This evolution of the Brazilian budgetary process, which passes through alternated 
periods of democracy and authoritarianism and that comprises six different constitutions until 
the beginning of the country’s current democratic phase, demonstrates that there were 
different institutional frameworks molding the relations between Executive and Legislature: 
sometimes the budgetary process was fully or chiefly in the hands of the Executive 
(constitutions of 1937 and 1967, both at the beginning of authoritarian regimes), sometimes in 
the hands of the Legislature (1891), sometimes in a co-participation fashion (1824, 1934 and 
1946). With the end of the military regime and the new opening process (processo de 
abertura), with its new Constitution also a new way was opened. With the Constitutional 
Assembly of 1988, installed in the 1st of February 1987, in October of the next year, 1988, 
the popularly known as the Constituição Cidadã (Civic Constitution) was enacted. One year 
later, for the first time since the start of the Military Regime, Brazilians went to the polls in 
November 1989 to elect a civilian president. 
Regarding the budgetary proposal, which is of my particular interest in this work, 
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution re-established to the Legislature the right to amend the budget and 
gave special emphasis to the planning of the bill. It devises the elaboration of a Pluriannual 
Plan (Plano Plurianual, PPA) which should be valid for four-years periods and serve as a 
Guideline for all other budgetary bills. It also foresees that a Budgetary Guidelines Bill (Lei 
de Diretrizes Orçamentárias) has to be yearly introduced in Parliament by the President and 
approved by both Houses of Congress before the President can send the actual Budget Bill. 
Finally, this last one, can only be amended accordingly to the extent in which it is in line with 
the previously mentioned statutes. 
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